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COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS 
AND COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING: 
BALANCING COMMUNITY 
EMPOWERMENT AND  
THE POLICE POWER 
Patricia E. Salkin and Amy Lavine* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the states have empowered local governments 
to develop plans and implement regulations for neighborhood 
and community development. When accomplished at the local or 
regional level, the interests and benefits of the community as a 
whole are to be weighed against the detriments to individuals. 
Much has been studied and written about the lack of meaningful 
public participation in the planning and land use regulatory 
process, suggesting that often low-income and minority 
communities are not fully engaged in the process, even when it 
may result in decisions negatively impacting their 
neighborhoods.
1
 Case studies have also shown that governments 
                                                          
* Patricia E. Salkin is the Associate Dean, Director of the Government 
Law Center and the Raymond & Ella Smith Distinguished Professor of Law 
at Albany Law School.  Amy Lavine is a staff attorney at the Government 
Law Center and the author of the Community Benefits Blog 
http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com. 
1
See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive 
Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the 
Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 831–837 (1998); 
Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative 
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning 
in Land Use Decisions Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 15–36 
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho I]. It should also be noted that planning and 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597275
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are sometimes so eager to stimulate local economic development 
that they fail to fully engage communities in the project review 
process, both to expedite development and to avoid confronting 
local opposition.
2
 This emphasis on short-term economic growth, 
however, may obscure a local government’s perception of the 
social and environmental needs of particular communities. When 
this occurs, formal planning processes have failed to accomplish 
their goals of engaging community members and guiding future 
growth in a manner that maximizes long-term benefits for the 
common good.  
                                                          
zoning boards tend to be composed of community elites, who often have ties 
to the development sector. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING 
SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 7–13 (2002) [hereinafter, GROWING SMART 
LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK]. See generally, Jerry L. Anderson, Is the Wheel 
Unbalanced? A Study of Bias on Zoning Boards, 36 URB. LAW. 447 (2004) 
(arguing that bias pervades zoning boards in favor of entrenched interests). 
The lack of socioeconomic diversity is particularly acute in larger cities, 
which results in “a pronounced bias toward the 
professional/technical/managerial class in our cities.” Id. at 464; see also 
Jerry L. Anderson, A Study of American Zoning Board Composition and 
Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues (Apr. 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1119582. But see Wayne Senville, Survey of 
Planning Board Members Enlightening (Oct. 2002), http://www.planetizen. 
com/node/66 (suggesting, in a less scientific survey, that greater diversity is 
being achieved on planning board). 
2
For example, plans for the Melrose Commons redevelopment project in 
the South Bronx were initially formed without community involvement, and 
they were poorly coordinated with the community’s needs. Changes were 
made only after residents organized and presented their concerns to planning 
officials. Eventually, the community’s initiative led to substantial 
modifications, and the project is today viewed as a success. See SUSTAINABLE 
COMMUNITIES NETWORK CASE STUDIES, URBAN RENEWAL in MELROSE 
COMMONS, (Sept. 18, 1996), http://www.sustainable.org/casestudies/ 
newyork/NY_af_melrose.html; see also Amy Wideman, Replacing Politics 
with Democracy: A Proposal for Community Planning in New York City and 
Beyond, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 135, 197 (2002) (describing New York City’s 
response to a community-based plan as “focus[ing] inordinately on economic 
repercussions for the city and what the city’s role and expenses would be in 
implementing aspects of the plan that could inhibit future industrial sitings in 
the neighborhood”).  
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New approaches to planning provide one response to 
systemic public participation problems. The environmental 
justice movement, for example, has sought to ensure a fair 
distribution of both environmental burdens and environmental 
goods by requiring local governments to make meaningful public 
participation available to all community members. Community-
based planning efforts have attempted to improve the planning 
process by focusing on small and distinct geographic areas and 
by developing collaborative and inclusive planning programs. 
Since the late 1990s, community benefits agreements (CBAs) 
have offered another method to increase community input in the 
development planning and review process.  
CBAs, in their purest form, are private contracts between a 
developer and a coalition of community interest groups.
3
 For 
communities that have historically been excluded from the 
planning process, CBAs can be a powerful tool to ensure that 
neighborhood interests are addressed as an integral component 
of development.
4
 By using CBAs, community coalitions can 
make project sponsors respond to their needs and interests, and 
they can bind developers to their promises through legally 
enforceable contract terms. Perhaps more significantly, the 
community is empowered to speak and make decisions for itself 
on myriad issues, including negotiating for community amenities 
that have traditionally been within the purview of the local 
comprehensive planning regime. The result, ideally, is growth 
                                                          
3
See Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, 
and Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 
L. 35, 46 (2008). 
4
See, e.g., Ryan Juskus & Elizabeth Elia, Long Time Coming, 150 
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE (2007), available at http://www.nhi.org/online/ 
issues/150/longtimecoming.html (“A neighborhood famous for its vitality 
under the constraints of segregation, Shaw was neglected and abused for so 
many ensuing decades . . . . One DC and Shaw resident claimed these 
blighted lots as community assets and declared that even these properties, if 
jealously guarded, could be a source of neighborhood power and wealth. This 
is the revolutionary idea of community-benefits agreements: that the 
community members—even those without money or power, who are usually 
ignored in development plans or manipulated like chess pieces—can be an 
asset and a force with which to contend.”).  
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and development that is accountable to the people it affects and 
equitable in its distribution of benefits and burdens. However, 
the people it affects are often a small subset of the municipal 
jurisdiction and the equitable distribution sought in the CBAs is 
limited to the proposed project area. 
The legal relationship between CBAs and planning is 
unclear. Critics may perceive CBAs as circumventing 
government planning processes in order to put insular 
neighborhood concerns ahead of broader metropolitan interests.
5
 
Supporters, on the other hand, may view traditional planning 
processes as inadequate and may see CBAs as a tool to advance 
civic engagement.
6
 CBA coalitions have been accused of abusing 
the tool when they fail to represent the full spectrum of 
community stakeholders, but as yet no workable definition of the 
“community” has been established.
7
   
This article explores how the comprehensive planning 
process and CBAs complement and contradict each other, and 
how both could be improved by innovative and more inclusive 
planning techniques. Part II provides a brief historical 
background on comprehensive planning and community 
development, including issues relating to community planning 
and public participation. Part III examines CBAs and their role 
in community empowerment, community development and the 
promotion of social justice principles, including equitable 
development. This part also provides examples of typical land 
use related elements found in existing CBAs. Using these 
examples, Part IV segues into a discussion regarding whether 
private CBAs usurp the public planning process. The section 
explores whether CBAs are just another type of community-
based plan and whether CBAs advance narrow interests at the 
expense of the larger community. The question of what local 
governments should do when presented with a CBA that is 
inconsistent with the local comprehensive land use plan is 
examined to determine whether amending the plan to incorporate 
                                                          
5
See infra Part IV.B. 
6
Gross, supra note 3, at 38. 
7
See infra Part III.A.1. 
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the community vision as articulated through the CBA is 
appropriate. The article concludes in Part V by pointing out that 
shortcomings of the current regulatory system allow local 
governments, intentionally or inadvertently, to exclude robust 
public participation from the development and implementation of 
comprehensive land use plans. This provides the impetus for 
privately negotiated CBAs, but these agreements may not always 
be ideal because not all parties to a CBA will have the best 
interests of the neighborhood or the community as a whole at the 
forefront of their agendas. While many CBAs have been 
successful, a number of case studies also reveal pitfalls in the 
process. The article concludes with the belief that local 
governments must be more inclusive and accountable in the 
public planning process to better meet the true goals of the 
community benefits movement.  
II. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Origins of Traditional Comprehensive Planning 
The federal and state governments have long recognized the 
role of municipalities in comprehensive planning for community 
development.
8
  Planning, in this context, may be best described 
as “an attempt to coordinate the development of all the 
interrelated aspects of the physical environment, and all the 
closely related aspects of the social and economic 
environment.”
9
 At the First National Conference on City 
Planning and the Problems of Congestion, which was convened 
in Washington, D.C., in 1909, Frederick Law Olmstead, Jr., 
described city plans as “a compendium of all regulations on 
building, physical development, ‘districting’ of land, health 
ordinances, and ‘police rules’ for the use and development of 
                                                          
8
See generally SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 5:2, 5:11 (5th 
ed. 2009) [hereinafter SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING]. 
9
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND 
PLANNING LAW, VOL. 1 10 (Thomson West 2003). 
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land.”
10
 Almost 20 years later, Alfred Bettman described the city 
plan as:  
. . . a master design for the physical development of the 
territory of the city. It constitutes the division of land 
between public and private uses, specifying the general 
location and extent of new public improvements, grounds 
and structures . . . and, in the case of private 
developments, the general distribution [of land areas] 
amongst various classes of uses, such as residential, 
business and industrial uses.
11
 
Beginning with the Model Standard City Planning Enabling 
Act in 1928 (“Standard Act”), local governments were vested 
with authority to develop community-wide plans.
12
 The Act 
provided for the establishment of a planning commission, which 
would be vested with the responsibility “to make and adopt a 
master plan for the physical development of the 
municipality . . . including, among other things, the general 
location, character, and extent of streets, viaducts, subways, 
bridges, waterways, water fronts, boulevards, parkways, 
playgrounds, squares, parks, aviation fields, and other public 
ways . . . .”
13
 The Standard Act additionally included provisions 
for the adoption of a master street plan, provisions for the 
approval of all public improvements by the planning 
commission, subdivision controls, and provisions for the 
establishment of a regional planning commission and a regional 
plan.
14
 Under the model set forth in the Standard Act, non-
                                                          
10
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 21 (West Group, 1998). 
11
Id. at 22 (citing PLANNING PROBLEMS OF TOWN, CITY AND REGION: 
PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE TWENTIETH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
CITY PLANNING, reprinted in W. GOODMAN & E. FREUND, PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING, 352–53 (4th ed. 1968)). 
12
U.S. Department of Commerce, A Standard City Planning Enabling 
Act (1928), available at http://myapa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/CP 
EnablingAct1928.pdf.  
13
Id. at 13–15. 
14
Id.; see also, Ruth Knack et al., The Real Story Behind the Standard 
Planning and Zoning Acts of the 1920s, Feb. 1996, at 4–6, available at 
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elected officials dominated the local planning function.
15
 It was 
believed that their arguably non-partisan status made them better 




Most of the states adopted the Standard Act, and although 
many of the states’ comprehensive planning statutes have been 
modernized, the influence of the Standard Act continues to 
resonate today.
17
 A process-oriented statute, one of the Standard 
Act’s most significant influences was its preference for optional 
rather than mandatory planning.
18
 While this led to the belief that 
planning was not necessarily a prerequisite to the adoption of 
zoning laws, Alfred Bettman explained that “[t]he zoning 
ordinance is, of course, execution and the planning precedes 
it . . . .”
19
 
Today, a comprehensive land use plan
20
 commonly refers to 
a written document that is formally adopted by a local legislative 
body, which contains goals, objectives and strategies for the 
future development and conservation of the community.
21
 It 
                                                          
http://myapa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/LULZDFeb96.pdf.  
15




See Rodney L. Cobb, Toward Modern Statutes: A Survey of State 
Laws on Local Land-Use Planning, in MODERNIZING STATE PLANNING 
STATUTES: THE GROWING SMART WORKING PAPERS 21 (1998).  
18
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §3.05 (5th ed., LexisNexis 
Matthew Bender 2003). 
19
Charles M. Harr, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 362 (1955) (quoting an unpublished note 
written by Bettman).  
20
Depending upon local definition, the terms “comprehensive land use 
plan,” “master plan” and “general plan” may be used interchangeably. 
21
However, while either legally or intuitively the comprehensive plan 
should be a written document, this is not the case in all states. For example, 
in New York, the enabling statutes suggest that a comprehensive plan be a 
written document. N.Y. Town Law § 272–a. (2009). However, the statutes 
also recognize the validity of prior caselaw that allowed the concept of the 
comprehensive plan to be a reflection of an ongoing planning process rather 
than “pay slavish servitude to any particular document.” Udell v. Haas, 235 
N.E.2d 897, 902 (1968). 
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should represent the “big picture” of what the community looks 
like today and what it aspires to look like in the future,
22
 and the 
policies identified in the plan should guide development 
regulations and decisions made under them.
23
 By providing a 
baseline for consistency regarding local governments’ land use 
decisions, the comprehensive plan helps to safeguard against 
arbitrary, irrational, biased and ad hoc actions.
24
  
Most states do not make the adoption of a comprehensive 
plan a statutory pre-requisite to the adoption of zoning 
regulations,
25
 but the notion that the plan precedes the regulation 
is widely accepted as a best practice.
26
 Where there is a 
comprehensive plan, the states also diverge on the question of 
whether zoning must be consistent with it: some states give no 
significance to the plan and do not require consistency; the 
majority of states do not require consistency but do consider the 
plan to be a factor in the evaluation of zoning regulations; and 
the rest hold the plan to be controlling and require all land use 
actions to be consistent with its goals and policies.
27
 Long a 
                                                          
22
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-6. 
23
JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: PRIMER FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 
AND CITIZENS 18 (1998); GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra 
note 1, at 7-7.  
24
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-7; 
Daniel J. Curtin & Jonathan D. Witten, Windfalls, Wipeouts, Givings, and 
Takings in Dramatic Redevelopment Projects: Bargaining for Better Zoning 
on Density, Views, and Public Access, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 325, 
335 (2005) (discussing the importance of a comprehensive plan in preventing 
manipulation of the planning process for private gain). 
25
See Stuart Meck, The Legislative Requirement that Zoning and Land 
Use Controls Be Consistent with an Independently Adopted Local 
Comprehensive Plan: A Model Statute, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 295, 305 
(2000) [hereinafter Meck, A Model Statute]. A survey published by the 
American Planning Association in 1998 revealed that ten states made local 
planning optional, twenty-five states made it conditionally mandatory (i.e., 
local governments would only be required to develop a plan if they created a 
planning commission); and fifteen states made local planning mandatory. 
Cobb, supra note 17, at 21–23.  
26
See SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, supra note 8 at § 5:1. 
27
Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning 
Law, 40 URB. LAW. 549, 549 (2008). The three approaches are referred to as 
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minority position, the consistency approach has steadily been 
gaining ground, with the result that “the comprehensive plan has 
been invested with an increasing role in judging land use 
regulations or actions so that . . . plans are required and, once 
in place, are a significant, if not decisive, factor . . . .”
28
   
The general goals and policies enunciated in modern 
comprehensive plans are typically organized into separate 
elements covering such issues as land use, housing, 
transportation, public facilities, open space, and economic 
development.
29
 The American Planning Association’s Growing 
Smart Legislative Guidebook, which was intended to provide a 
modern update of the Standard Act,
30
 recommends that state 
planning enabling statutes reflect a three tiered approach to local 
comprehensive plan elements: the most important elements, such 
as housing and transportation, should be mandatory; important 
elements that may not be appropriate for smaller local 
governments, or for other good reasons, should have an opt-out 
alternative; and elements that are not essential, but which the 
state considers appropriate planning topics, should be optional.
31
  
The states have taken varying approaches. For example, 
Florida’s enabling statute is very detailed and includes 
mandatory, opt-out and optional elements.
32
 In New York, by 
                                                          
the “unitary view” (plans not required and given no effect), the “planning 
factor view” (plans are a factor in judging land use regulations), and the 
“planning mandate view” (plans required and zoning must be consistent with 
them). Id.; see also Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 331–37 (2005) 
(discussing different state approaches to comprehensive planning). 
28
Sullivan, supra note 27, at 549. 
29
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-61 
to 7-66. 
30
Recognizing that “[t]he planning approaches of the 1920s are incapable 
of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century[,]” the American 
Planning Association decided to develop a new set of model guidelines. The 
product culminated in the Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook, which 
contains model planning statutes and commentary to help explain their 
purposes and applications. GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra 
note 1, at xxix–xxx. 
31
Id. at 7-62. 
32
FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2009). 
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contrast, the state has chosen to provide statutory guidance as to 
the appropriate elements to be addressed in the comprehensive 
plan, but the listing of elements is completely optional.
33
 Other 
states fall somewhere in the middle. Arizona specifies both 
mandatory and optional elements, which may vary depending on 
the city’s size,
34
 and while Idaho’s statute is limited to 
mandatory elements, it allows local governments to opt out if 
they can explain why they should not have to address a 
particular element.
35
 The elements specified in Maryland’s 
planning legislation are almost all mandatory, with only one 
optional topic,
36
 whereas New Hampshire requires only two 




An important characteristic of the comprehensive planning 
framework is that plans remain flexible and open to change, 
allowing the creation of new planning goals and new strategies 
to achieve existing ones. The Growing Smart Guidebook, 
recognizing that plans must be continually reassessed in light of 
changing physical assets and new social paradigms, recommends 
that local governments review and revise their plans at least 
once every five years.
38
 The statutory content of comprehensive 
plans has similarly expanded over the years. Contemporary 








                                                          
33
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272–a (2003). 
34
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9–461.05 (2009). 
35
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67–6508 (2007). 
36
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1.04 (2009). 
37
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:2 (2008). 
38
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-230 
to 7-233.  
39
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583(c)(1)(B)(4) (Deering 2009); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(e)(2) (West 2009). 
40
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 9–461.05(E)(9); FLA. STAT. 
§ 163.3177(3)(a)(6) (amended 2008); MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B, 
§ 3.05(a)(4)(iii)(2) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(q) (2009); 
OR. ADMIN. R. 660-012-0020(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-510(D)(8) 
(amended 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(6)(a)(vii) (2005); WIS. 
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 and water 
resources.
44
 Community awareness regarding the impacts of 
human development on climate change has recently prompted 
some states to amend their planning statutes to include 
alternative energy and sustainability goals.
45
 Local governments, 
even where not required, have frequently adopted similar 
elements in their general plans.
46
 
                                                          
STAT. § 66.1001(2)(c) (2009). 
41
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11–821(C)(1)(b) (amended 2008); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-23(c), (d)(1) (2009); FLA. STAT. 
§ 163.3177(6)(a) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(f) (2009). 
42
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 11–821(D)(2), 9–461.05(E)(1) 
(amended 2008); CAL. GOV. CODE § 65302(d); N.H. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 674:2(III)(d) (2009); MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 3.05(a)(4)(ix) (amended 
2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 81D(5) (amended 1998); N.H.  REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 674:2(III)(d). (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(b) 
(2009); 53 PENN. STAT. ANN. § 10301(a)(6) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6–
29–510(D)(4) (amended 2005); WIS. STAT. § 66.1001(2)(e) (2009). 
43
See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 65302(g)(2009); FLA. STAT. 
§ 163.3177(7)(h) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:2(III)(e) (2009); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(l). 
44
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 9–461.05(D)(5), 11–821(C)(3) 
(amended 2008); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 30–28–106 sec. (3) (IV) (amended 
2009); FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(c)(2009); MD. CODE ANN. Art. 66B, 
§ 3.05(a)(4)(vi) (amended 2009); 53 PENN. STAT. ANN. § 10301(b) (2000). 
45
In 2008, for example, Florida amended its planning enabling act to 
require local plans to consider methods to discourage urban sprawl, support 
energy-efficient development patterns, and reduce greenhouse gases. See Act 
of July 1, 2008, 2008 Fla. Laws ch. 191 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. 
§ 163.3177). Arizona also requires planning for energy efficiency and 
renewable energy development. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 11-821 (C)(4), 9-
461.05 (E) (10); see also N.J. STAT. § 40:55D-28 (b)(16) (West 2009); 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-106 (3)(a)(VI), 31-23-206 (1)(f); 53 PENN. 
STAT. ANN. § 10301.1 (2009). 
46
Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening 
State and Local Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change 
Challenges and Preserve Resources for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121 (2009). 
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B. Community-Based Planning 
Despite a lack of guidance from most state comprehensive 
planning statutes,
47
 “[t]here has long been a move away from 
centralized planning in the urban context toward more 
community-based planning.”
48
 Strongly influenced by the racial 
and socioeconomic discrimination endemic in the implementation 
of urban renewal plans, and the Civil Rights movement of the 
1960s, Paul Davidoff articulated a theory of “advocacy 
planning” in 1965 that remains applicable today: 
The recommendation that city planners represent and 
plead the plans of many interest groups is founded upon 
the need to establish an effective urban democracy, one 
in which citizens may be able to play an active role in 
the process of deciding public policy. Appropriate policy 
in a democracy is determined through a process of 
political debate. The right course of action is always a 
matter of choice, never of fact. In a bureaucratic age 
great care must be taken that choices remain in the area 
of public view and participation.
49
  
The ideals of inclusiveness, democracy and public 
participation remain fundamental to community-based planning, 
                                                          
47
Very few state planning enabling acts specifically provide for the 
creation of small-scale comprehensive plans. Exceptions include Montana, 
New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-
601(4) (2009) (requiring neighborhood plans to be consistent with the 
municipality’s growth policy); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:2(III)(j) 
(requiring a master plan to be adopted before any neighborhood plan, and 
requiring that plan to be consistent with the master plan); D.C. Code § 1-
306.03 (2009). 
48
Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and 
Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 578; see also James 
Jennings, Race, Politics, and Community Development in U.S. Cities: Urban 
Planning, Community Participation, and the Roxbury Master Plan in Boston, 
594 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13–14 (2004) (discussing the 
origins of the community-based planning movement). 
49
Paul Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, 34(4) J. AM. 
INST. PLANNERS 331 (1965), reprinted in READINGS IN PLANNING THEORY 
211–12 (Scott Campbell & Susan S. Fainstein, eds., 2d ed. 2003).  
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Community-based planning recognizes that metropolitan 
plans may not be adequate to meet the needs of individual 
neighborhoods, as “[p]eople who are close to neighborhood 
issues can clearly identify community needs and advocate 
passionately for local concerns.”
51
 This type of planning is also 
premised on a belief that a city’s general plan will be made 
stronger by encompassing separately developed neighborhood 
plans.
52
 In other words, it is community-driven, rather than “top 
down.”
53
 This type of paradigm shift also requires a reappraisal 
of the role that professional planners play in the land use 
process. Gone are the “ostensibly omniscient” non-partisan 
                                                          
50
Gross, supra note 3, at 37–39. 
51
Department of City Planning, Community Based Planning, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/community_planning/index.shtml 
(providing an overview of the city’s 197-a community planning process) (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
52
Seattle’s neighborhood planning process has been thoroughly evaluated 
and it was found to be a success. The program received a 93% approval 
rating in a citizen survey, and the city found that it had positive impacts on 
the coordination of public entities, provided valuable education to citizens 
concerning the land use process, encouraged community-building, facilitated 
ongoing citizen participation, and minimized public opposition and legal 
challenges. The full report identified problems with the process and made 
suggestions for improvements. Seattle Office of City Auditor, Revisit 
Neighborhood Plan Implementation. http://seattle.gov/audit/docs/Published 
NPI.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
53
See New York City Community-Based Planning Task Force, Planning 
for All New Yorkers, http://www.mas.org/planningcenter/atlas/pdf/ 
PlanningForAllNewYorkers_PlatformForAllNewYorkers.pdf. The 
Community-Based Planning Task Force, which is staffed by the Municipal 
Art Society, “is a coalition of grassroots organizations, citywide civic groups, 
community boards, elected officials, professional planners, and academics. 
They were motivated to act after seeing that, in some cases, plans devised by 
the city did not address neighborhood needs, while, at the same time, there is 
no effective mechanism to implement the creative, proactive plans that 
communities developed for their neighborhoods.” The Campaign for 
Community-Based Planning: Task Force, http://communitybasedplanning. 
wordpress.com/task-force/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).  
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planners that implemented the Standard Acts; modern city 
planners, in addition to developing regulatory standards and 
synthesizing comprehensive planning goals, should act “as 
facilitators, community organizers, and gatherers and 
distributors of information . . . .”
54
  
Because of the smaller scale of community-based plans, there 
are often more opportunities for citizen engagement, whether 
through formal public hearings, or through more informal 
planning workshops and charettes.
55
 The New York City 197-a 
planning process, for example, requires a number of public 
hearings and approval by the planning commission and city 
council before a community plan can be adopted.
56
 With the help 
of proactive community boards and civic organizations such as 
the Municipal Art Society, many plans have been shaped 
through community outreach efforts and collaborative planning 
sessions.
57
 Other cities, such as Minneapolis, offer funding and 
                                                          
54
Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A 
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and 
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 292 
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho II]. 
55
Many cities have developed community-based planning frameworks, 
whether referred to as neighborhood plans, specific plans, small area plans, 
or community-based plans. See, e.g., San Jose Department of Planning, 
Building & Code Enforcement, Specific Plans, Overview, http://www.san 
joseca.gov/planning/spec_plan/default.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2009); City of 
Columbus, Guide to Area and Neighborhood Planning, http://assets. 
columbus.gov/development/planning/PlanningGuide.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 
2009); Minneapolis Community Planning & Economic Development, 
Neighborhood Guide for Developing Planning Documents, http://www.ci. 
minneapolis.mn.us/cped/docs/NeighborhoodGuideforDevelopingPlanning.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009); Baltimore Neighborhood Planning Program, 
http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/neighborhoods/npp/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2009). 
56
New York City Charter § 197-a (2008). 
57
See, e.g., The Municipal Art Society, A Vision for Midtown’s East 
River Waterfront is Unveiled, Jun. 11, 2007, https://s12544.gridserver. 
com/viewarticle.php?id=1731&category=46 (describing the results of a 
charette intended to define goals for the development of the East River 
waterfront); GREENPOINT 197-A COMMITTEE, GREENPOINT 197-A PLAN 6 
(1998), available at http://www.gwapp.org/GWAPP/01-Introduction.PDF 
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technical assistance for qualified community organizations that 
wish to build public participation and develop small area plans.
58
 
Innovative methods to involve people from all sectors of the 
community are also being developed. The San Francisco 
Planning Department organizes walking and bus tours to 
encourage discussions about how residents want their 
neighborhoods to develop,
59
 and San Jose has used an online 
planning wiki to reach people who cannot attend (or do not want 
to attend) planning meetings in person.
60
 
Community-based, small scale planning has moved a long 
way from the rigid and disconnected framework set up by the 
Standard Act, but it shares with more conventional planning 
models the basic idea that communities benefit from long range 
planning based on common goals and visions. The 
comprehensive plan, in the context of community-based 
frameworks, is a more dynamic tool, however. As law professor 
Alejandro Esteban Camacho explains: 
The collaborative model recognizes that modern land use 
planning and development are not static enterprises, but 
rather a continuing process that must be flexible in order 
to maximize effectiveness. Adaptable planning and 
permitting, which are natural extensions of a problem 
solving orientation, draw on a pragmatic notion of 
decision-making as an ongoing, iterative process of 
                                                          
(“Through public forums, workshops, discussions, petitions, and local 
newspapers, collaboration between community-based groups, merchants, 
residents, manufacturers, new and old immigrants, and the young and the old 
began to revitalize the community by means of this local planning process.”).  
58
See CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, COMMUNITY PLANNING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES 
(2006), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cped/docs/citizen_ 
participation_guidelines.pdf.  
59
San Francisco Planning Department, Better Neighborhoods, The 
Planning Process, http://www.sfgov.org/site/planning_index.asp?id=25172 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).  
60
Press Release, City of San Jose, San Jose Harnesses Web 2.0 
Technology to Help Determine City’s Future and Growth (July 31, 2009), 
available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/pdf/WikiplanningReleaseFINAL.pdf. 
SALKIN REVISED.DOC 4/26/2010  11:32 PM 
172 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
design, implementation, and evaluation. Adaptability 
applies not just to plans and agreements but also to the 
regulatory process itself; as the process matures, it is 
evaluated and adjusted to incorporate information such as 
the value of different forms of participation in facilitating 




Another significant difference between traditional and 
community-based comprehensive planning relates to the timing 
and duration of community engagement. Most state enabling 
statutes indicate that it is sufficient to hold one public hearing 
during the development of a comprehensive plan, and one 
hearing during the legislative process for its adoption.
62
 Some 
states, however, have specifically provided for increased public 
participation in the preparation and adoption of local plans.
63
 The 
American Planning Association’s Growing Smart Legislative 
Guidebook adopts this approach: 
The processes for engaging the public in planning are not 
made clear in many planning statutes.  Requirements for 
public notice, public hearings, workshops, and 
distribution and publication of plans and development 
regulations are often improvised. Consequently, the 
public may find its role and the use of its input uncertain, 
and it may be suspicious of plans and decisions that 
emerge. Planning should be doing the opposite; it should 
be engaging citizens positively at all steps in the planning 
process, acknowledging and responding to their 
comments and concerns. Through collaborative 
                                                          
61
Camacho II, supra note  54, at 295. 
62
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (2009).  
63
See PATRICIA E SALKIN, COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES FOR PREPARING 
AND ADOPTING A LOCAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, in MODERNIZING STATE 
PLANNING STATUTES: THE GROWING SMART WORKING PAPERS, vol. 2 
(American Planning Association 1998) (noting a number of statutory 
approaches to achieving a more collaborative and inclusive planning process, 
including a requirement in the State of Washington for cities and counties that 
plan under the Growth Management Act to establish and disseminate a public 
participation program, see R.C.W. sec. 36.70A.140). 
SALKIN REVISED.DOC 4/26/2010  11:32 PM 
 COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS 173
approaches, planning should build support for outcomes 




Community-based planning, moreover, recognizes that there 
is a continuing need for public participation throughout the 
plan’s implementation. This is especially true given the 
increasing popularity of development agreements, planned unit 
developments (PUDs), special overlay districts, and similar 
long-term land use controls. Unlike zoning ordinances, which 
are intended to be applied uniformly, the express purpose of 
these controls is to make the planning process more flexible and 
more easily tailored to specific properties. However, while 
“these negotiated processes provide[] the applicant-developer 
with substantial opportunities to participate in the decision 
process, public input . . . has not advanced beyond a traditional 
command and control model that only provides access to the 
process at the local agency’s final approval of the agreement.”
65
 
To the extent that these regulatory techniques affect a 
community’s long-term goals, as embodied in the adaptive 
comprehensive plan, the community arguably should have a 
more significant role in the decision making process.
66
 
C. Environmental Justice 
One of the hallmarks of the environmental justice 
movement
67
 is “meaningful involvement,” which requires that:  
(1) people have an opportunity to participate in decisions 
about activities that may affect their environment and/or 
                                                          
64
GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at xlvii. 
65
Camacho I, supra note 1, at 17.  
66
See Camacho II, supra note 54, at 297–99. 
67
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental 
justice as “[t]he fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies.” United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/ej.html (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2009). 
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health; (2) the public’s contribution can influence the 
regulatory agency’s decision; (3) their concerns will be 
considered in the decision making process; and (4) the 




While the comprehensive planning framework allows more 
opportunities for public participation than does an ad hoc zoning 
process,
69
 and community-based planning can encourage even 
more public involvement, communities are still overlooked
70
—
especially those “discrete and insular minorities” that may be 
more in need of protection than other groups.
71
 
In additional to meaningful involvement, the environmental 
justice movement seeks to ensure fair treatment, meaning “that 
no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of 
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, 
governmental and commercial operations or policies.”
72
 Fair 
treatment also requires an equitable distribution of environmental 
goods, such as parks, open spaces, and cultural and historical 
resources. Too often, the low income and minority communities 
that are excluded from the planning process are the same 
communities that are burdened by negative environmental 
impacts and provided with few environmental benefits. One 
model approach proposes to address this reality by 




Wideman, supra note 2, at 191–92 (“[Comprehensive] plans, 
especially when they result from an inclusive process, do more to foster 
public participation and simultaneously decrease the potential for corruption 
because of the diversity of opinions shaping the decisions. Some argue that ad 
hoc zoning, in contrast, is vulnerable to domination by factions.”). 
70
See, e.g., id. at 135, 144 (“Indeed, the [New York City Planning] 
Commission’s processes seem designed to discourage public participation—
public hearings take place at ten o’clock on Wednesday mornings, making the 
hearings inaccessible to those with daytime obligations such as work or 
family, and calendar notices and subscriptions are available at a large fee.”). 
71
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 
(1938). 
72
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Basic Information, 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Oct. 
16, 2009). 
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recommending the appointment of a public participation 
coordinator to work with various communities and stakeholders 
to invite and encourage broader participation.
73
 
It has been noted that, “the next frontier for both the 
[environmental justice] movement and the focus of 
environmental justice scholarship . . . is land use planning.”
74
 
California has been a pioneer in incorporating environmental 
justice concerns into the local land use planning process.
75
 
Ensuring meaningful participation by all cross-sections of the 
community is important to give credibility and respect to the 
process.  “Providing for active involvement by people-of-color 
and low-income residents in developing the goals of a locality’s 
comprehensive plan, at least as it relates to their own 
neighborhoods, will help to ensure that local zoning laws or 
ordinances are developed and/or amended to reflect the desires 
of these communities.”
76
 As professor Craig Anthony “Tony” 
Arnold argues, “land use planning and regulation foster choice, 
self-determination, and self-definition for local neighborhoods, 




In 1991, the First National People of Color Environmental 
Leadership Summit was held. The conference delegates drafted 
seventeen principles that better define environmental justice, and 
these principles have served as a pioneering document for the 
                                                          
73
 SALKIN, supra note 63, at 151. 
74
Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and 
Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
75
See Chapter 762 of the California Laws of 2001, which required the 
Governor’s Office of Planning and Research to publish guidelines for the 
incorporation of environmental justice issues in the general plans of 
municipalities. 
76
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ADDRESSING 
COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND 
USE PLANNING & ZONING 44 (2003), available at http://www.napawash.org/ 
Pubs/EJ.pdf. 
77
Craig Anthony Arnold, Land Use Regulation and Environmental 
Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10427 (June 2000). 
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rapidly expanding movement.
78
 A number of these principles are 
directly applicable to community development. For example, 
Principle Five states: “[e]nvironmental [j]ustice affirms the 
fundamental right to political, economic, cultural, and 
environmental self-determination of all peoples.”
79
 This principle 
is related to both community planning and CBAs because both 
processes emphasize community-driven planning and often 
include the desire and promise to improve local economic and 
environmental situations. Principle Twelve states: 
“[e]nvironmental [j]ustice affirms the need for urban and rural 
ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and rural 
areas in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of 
all our communities, and provide[s] fair access for all to the full 
range of resources.”
80
 This is both an example of an aspirational 
goal appropriate for inclusion in local comprehensive plans, and 
in the CBA process, project applicants often offer environmental 
benefits such as park and open space and green building designs.  
The equitable development movement, which is closely 
related to the environmental justice movement, is grounded in 
four principles: integrating people strategies and place strategies; 
reducing local and regional disparities; promoting “double 
bottom line” investments that produce fair returns for investors 
as well as benefits for the community, and ensuring meaningful 
community participation, leadership and ownership.
81
 As 
discussed more fully below, CBAs are noted as one effective 




                                                          
78
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF 







Angela Glover Blackwell, Equitable Development, in BUILDING 
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS (Roger A. 
Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones, eds., 2009). 
82
Id.  
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
AGREEMENTS MOVEMENT  
The CBA movement originated in California in the late 
1990s as a way to make large-scale development projects more 
accountable to the neighborhoods that they impact.
83
 The basic 
model is simple: community groups form a coalition and use its 
capacity for building public support to persuade the project 
developer to provide amenities and mitigations desired by local 
residents, business owners, and employees. After negotiations, 
agreements between the coalition and the developer are 
memorialized in a legally enforceable bilateral contract.
84
 In 
states where local governments are authorized to enter into 
development agreements, CBAs are often incorporated into these 
documents so that municipal authorities, in addition to 




A. The Overlap of CBAs and Comprehensive Plans 
From the outset, CBA coalitions have aspired to achieve 
environmental and social justice goals for the communities they 
represent, seeking to bind developers to commitments for living 
wages, local hiring policies, and increased environmental 
standards, among other things.
86
 Like community-based planning 
                                                          
83
Patricia Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits 
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations 
for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 291, 301–306 (discussing the Hollywood and Highland 
CBA). 
84
Id. at 293–94. 
85
Id. at 295. Development agreements are authorized in about a dozen 
states. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land 
Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: 
Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 663, 671 n.32 (2001). 
86
See generally Julian Gross et al., Community Benefits Agreements: 
Making Development Projects Accountable, GOOD JOBS FIRST & THE 
CALIFORNIA PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES (2005), available at 
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programs, they have drawn attention to the fact that the planning 
and development review process often fails to address the needs 
of historically disempowered low income, minority, and non-
English speaking communities.
87
 While supporters of 
community-based planning have sought to change the planning 
and development review process to make it more inclusive and 
accessible, the CBA contract model allows community coalitions 
to bypass the traditional planning process entirely. 
Many of the commitments contained in CBAs relate 
primarily to labor standards and corporate operations (e.g., 
wage and hiring provisions), but other CBA promises involve 
the same concerns that have historically been addressed through 
the planning and zoning process. Provisions relating to land use, 
housing, transportation, environmental standards, and small 
business development have all become common in CBAs. In 
many cases, and particularly in California and other states that 
recognize development agreements, this has led to positive 
results, with community, government and private sector 
representatives working together in a sort of extra-public-
private-partnership. Yet, in other cases, CBA coalitions have 
failed to gain the support of a broad enough cross section of 
community interests to be considered legitimate. This has been 
especially problematic in New York, where local governments 
are not formally authorized to engage in development 
negotiations.
88
 CBAs negotiated under such circumstances are 
                                                          
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/cba2005final.pdf. 
87
Gross, supra note 3, at 37–38 (2008) (“Community-based 
organizations often assert that low-income neighborhoods, non-English-
speaking areas, and communities of color have little voice in the development 
process. Laws concerning public notice and participation are sometimes 
poorly enforced, and official public hearings are often held during the 
workday.”). 
88
In New York, any zoning changes offered by a city in exchange for 
development amenities must be undertaken according to a general incentive 
zoning ordinance applying to all property developments. N.Y. GEN. CITY 
§ 81–d (2003). However, development often occurs not with the assistance of 
local governments, but under the aegis of either a state or local economic 
development authority. These quasi-public agencies have broad authority to 
condition various types of subsidies, including zoning overrides, on certain 
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often depicted as “developer-driven,” and they may interfere 
with the planning process rather than improving it. 
The following subsections describe how various CBAs have 
incorporated community development issues usually reserved as 
part of the comprehensive or neighborhood planning process. 
For purposes of this section, several agreements that are only 
arguably “CBAs” will be discussed.
89
 These, problematic 
“CBAs,” which have not encouraged inclusiveness, transparency 
and accountability in the development review process, are 
discussed in the next Part.
90
 
1. Meaningful Public Participation and  
Equitable Development 
The community benefits movement, like community-based 
planning and environmental justice, has made meaningful 
community involvement in the development process a priority 
goal. The act of forming a coalition and demanding that 
developers be accountable to the neighborhoods that they impact 
is in itself a form of public participation, and the agreements 
obtained through CBA negotiations often include provisions to 
ensure that coalition groups will continue to be heard in the 
future. 
Under most CBAs, the developer must maintain continued 
contact with the coalition and keep it apprised of the project’s 
status. An advisory committee is often set up, including 
                                                          
development conditions, and to memorialize such agreements in bilateral 
contracts. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. § 858 (powers of industrial development 
agencies); N.Y. UNCONSOL. Ch. 252 § 5 (powers of the Empire State 
Development Corporation).  
89
CBA advocates have attempted to define the CBA concept as “a 
legally binding contract (or set of related contracts), setting forth a range of 
community benefits regarding a development project, and resulting from 
substantial community involvement.” Gross, supra note 3, at 37. This 
definition excludes all of the New York CBAs. 
90
The Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market and Columbia 
University CBAs have been criticized for their lack of community 
involvement and it has been forcefully argued that they are not, in fact, 
community benefits agreements. See id. at 41–44. 
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developer and coalition representatives, and this committee may 
make recommendations on project plans or implementation 
measures.
91
 This type of framework gives community 
representatives a formal role in the project’s development, but a 
few CBAs have gone a step farther by giving coalitions a larger 
role in the general planning process. The coalition that 
negotiated the Ballpark Village CBA, for example, secured 
$100,000 from the developer for a professionally prepared 
economic impact study. The study was directed to address “the 
effects of new construction and rising land values in downtown 
San Diego on the Neighboring Communities and [to] recommend 
specific policy measures to encourage investment as well as 
protect long-term, Low-Income Local Residents from 
displacement.”
92
 In Pittsburgh, a CBA concerning the new 
Penguins Arena included funding for the creation of a 
neighborhood master plan, which will cover issues relating to 
land use, community services, parks and open space, housing, 
social and environmental impacts, urban design, education, 
                                                          
91
The Staples Center CBA, for example, established an Advisory 
Committee to provide input to the developer about the construction 
management plan, the traffic management plan, the waste management plan, 
the neighborhood traffic protection plan, and other environmental concerns 
(e.g. pedestrian safety, air quality, green building). Staples Center, 
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at sec. XI, A-13 (2001), available at 
http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/Los%20Angeles%20Sports%2
0and%20Entertainment%20District%20Project.pdf [hereinafter Staples CBA]; 
see also Dearborn Street Implementation Committee, EXECUTED SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT, at art. 5, http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?id= 
1464 [hereinafter Dearborn Street CBA]; Hunters Point Implementation 
Committee, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 14 (2008), http://www. 
communitybenefits.org/downloads/Bayview%20Hunters%20Point%20CBA.pd
f [hereinafter Hunters Point CBA]; Pacoima Community Oversight 
Committee, PLAZA PACOIMA PROJECT COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 
sec. X [hereinafter Pacoima Plaza CBA]; Park East Community Advisory 
Committee, PARK EAST REDEVELOPMENT COMPACT, http://www.community 
benefits.org/downloads/PERC.pdf [hereinafter Park East Redevelopment 
Compact]. 
92
Ballpark Village Project, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 12 
(2005), available at http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/Ballpark% 
20Village%20CBA.pdf [hereinafter Ballpark Village CBA]. 
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economic development, traffic, arts and culture, historic 
preservation and uses for vacant property. The Penguins, 
moreover, agreed to postpone the submission of further 
development proposals until after the plan’s completion.
93
 
The site-specific nature of CBAs also offers an effective way 
to impose mitigation requirements on developers in order to 
ensure a more equitable distribution of negative environmental 
impacts.
94
 Many CBAs, for example, include provisions to limit 
construction impacts such as diesel exhaust, particulate 
emissions and dust.
95
 The CBA covering the LAX airport 
                                                          
93
One Hill Neighborhood Coalition & Sports and Exhibition Authority 
of Pittsburg, HILL DISTRICT COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 5–6 
(2008), http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?id=1463 [hereinafter 
Penguins CBA]. To be specific, the Penguins only agreed to postpone further 
development proposals until February 2010. 
94
See Larissa Larsen, The Pursuit of Responsible Development: 
Addressing Anticipated Benefits and Unwanted Burdens through Community 
Benefits Agreements 6 (Ctr. For Local State, and Urban Policy Working 
Paper Series, No. 9, 2009) (stating that “spatial inequity is central to the 
environmental justice movement” and “relevant to the site-specific nature of 
CBAs”) (citing DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
DIFFERENCE (Blackwell Publishing 1996)). 
95
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 35, 
http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/pr/cba.pdf [hereinafter Atlantic Yards CBA] 
(requiring a plan for minimizing truck idling); Ballpark Village CBA, supra 
note 92, at 6, 17, 22, 24–25, 28, 30 (requiring contaminated soils will not be 
shipped to treatment facilities in urban neighborhoods or that have adverse 
compliance histories, restrictions in pesticide use in landscaping, prohibition 
on onsite incineration, minimized idling, and designated construction routes); 
Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91 (requiring trucks to minimize idling, and 
requiring the developer to give preference to contractors that use low 
emission equipment); LAX Master Plan Program, COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
AGREEMENT, at 17, 20, 22, 28, 29, available at http://www.laxmasterplan. 
org/commBenefits/pdf/LAX_CBA_Final.pdf [hereinafter LAX CBA] 
(requiring electrified cargo gates to reduce emissions, $500,000 to replace 
high emission equipment, requirement to phasing out airport vehicles and 
replacing them with low emission or alternative vehicles, no idling, that for 
diesel equipment best available emissions control devices be used for diesel 
equipment as well as ultra low sulfur fuel, that rock crushing will be located 
away from the communities neighboring LAX in order to reduce dust, 
designated construction routes); Columbia University, COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
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expansion also included special protections for communities 
located next to the airport, which had long suffered from the 
airport’s noise and pollution. The airport authority agreed to 
fund an air quality study and a health impact study, the latter 
focusing on upper respiratory diseases and hearing loss. 
Nighttime departures were also restricted to limit noise, and 
more than $4 million was allotted for soundproofing nearby 
homes and schools.
96
 Since the LAX CBA was completed in 




For industrial projects that create extensive negative 
environmental impacts, Good Neighbor Agreements (“GNAs”) 
can also be used to mandate protections for nearby 
communities.
98
 GNAs use the same community-corporation 
contract framework as CBAs, but they typically focus on the 
complex technical mitigation solutions required by heavy 
industrial facilities such as oil refineries, mines, chemical plants, 
foundries, and large-scale agricultural operations. Most GNAs 
require information about plant operations to be made available 
                                                          
AGREEMENT 34, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/gca/pdf-files/CBAAgreement 
.pdf [hereinafter Columbia CBA] (ultra low sulfur fuels); Purina Site 
Development, Community Benefits Agreement, http://amy.m.lavine. 
googlepages.com/FINALPDFLongfellowCBA-Feb.242008.pdf [hereinafter 
Longfellow CBA]; COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT: CONCERNING THE 
CHRISTINA AVENUE COMPOSTING FACILITY BY AND BETWEEN PENINSULA 
COMPOST CO., LLC AND THE S. WILMINGTON COALITION 9–10 (2007) 
[hereinafter Peninsula Compost CBA] (prohibiting truck traffic in adjacent 
residential communities and requiring that trucks must be covered).  
96
LAX CBA, supra note 95, at 6.  
97
In the Gateway Center CBA, for instance, the developer agreed to 
work with the New York City Department of Environmental Protection to 
test for particulate emissions. Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market, 
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT 33 [hereinafter Gateway Center CBA], 
available at http://www.bronxgateway.com/documents/copy_of_community_ 
benefits_agreement/Signed_CBA_2_1_06.pdf; see also Ballpark Village CBA, 
supra note 92. 
98
See generally CPN, Good Neighbor Agreements: A Tool For 
Environmental and Social Justice, http://www.cpn.org/topics/environment/ 
goodneighbor.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (explaining the purpose, 
benefits, and general scope of good neighbor agreements).  
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to the public, and they often require facilities to be open to 
inspection by designated community members or third parties. 
Other provisions directly restrict corporate signatories. They 
may be required to formulate accident prevention and 
preparedness plans, covering such contingencies as chemical 
spills and fires, and they may have to implement various 
pollution prevention strategies. Although some GNAs have 
included provisions relating to local hiring, union neutrality, and 
funding for health centers and parks,
99
 they do not usually 
address the variety of issues covered by most CBAs.
100
 Another 
difference is that some GNAs are voluntary agreements that seek 
primarily to build relationships and create dialogues about 
pollution reduction and community health,
101
 whereas the CBA 
movement makes enforceability a paramount concern.
102
 
The close connection between CBAs, GNAs, and 
environmental justice is evident in Connecticut’s 2008 law 
regarding environmental justice communities
103
—the only general 
                                                          
99
The Unocal GNA included funding for health studies and for a clinic, 
a commitment to improve the site’s landscaping and construct a bike path, 
funding for vocational training at the local high school, a hiring preference 
for local employees, $4.5 million for transportation infrastructure 
improvements, and $300,000 annually for 15 years to go into a community 
fund. Good Neighbor Agreement: Unocal (on file with author). A promise to 
donate certain conservation easements was included in the Stillwater Mine 
GNA, as well as a promise that any land acquired by the company after the 
GNA was signed would be encumbered with a conservation easement 
restricting residential subdivisions. The GNA also limited permissible 
locations for mine-sponsored housing. Good Neighbor Agreement: Stillwater 
Mining Company, http://www.northernplains.org/files/2005amendedgna (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
100
See Gross, supra note 3, at 40, n.22. 
101
See, e.g., The Southeast Como Improvement Association: Ritrama 
Agreement,  http://secomo.org/drupal/index.php?q=ritrama-agreement (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2009); The Southeast Como Improvement Association: Rock 
Tenn. Agreement, http://secomo.org/drupal/index.php?q=rock-tenn-
agreement (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
102
Gross, supra note 3, at 39 (2007–2008) (“[L]egal enforceability 
should be a prerequisite for something to be termed a CBA.”). 
103
Conn. P.A. 08-94, S. 1, (codified as CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a 
(2008)).  
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state or local law yet to be enacted that attempts to regulate 
CBA-like agreements.
104
 The statute defines a “community 
environmental benefit agreement” (“CEBA”) as:  
[A] written agreement entered into by a municipality and 
an owner or developer of real property whereby the 
owner or developer agrees to develop real property that 
is to be used for any new or expanded affecting facility 
and to provide financial resources for the purpose of the 
mitigation, in whole or in part, of impacts reasonably 
related to the facility, including, but not limited to, 
impacts on the environment, traffic, parking and noise.
105
  
Unlike CBAs, these CEBAs are only implicated in the 
construction of “affecting facilities,” which are defined as heavy 
industrial facilities that are major pollution generators.
106
 While a 
local government can enter into a CEBA regarding any affecting 
facility, the law’s requirements apply only when an affecting 
facility is being located in an “environmental justice 
community,”
107
 defined as a census tract designated as distressed 
under state law or with at least 30% of residents at or below 
200% of the poverty line.
108
 When the law does apply, the 
developer must consult with the local government regarding the 
need for a CEBA,
109
 which may include provisions for on and 
off site mitigations and “[f]unding for activities such as 
environmental education, diesel pollution reduction, construction 
                                                          
104
In Milwaukee and Atlanta, local laws have been passed requiring 
community benefits to be included in certain developments. While the 
Connecticut legislation is a general law, applying throughout the state, both 
the Milwaukee and Atlanta CBA are limited to specific sites within their 
jurisdictions. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 83, at 319; Amy Lavine, 
Atlanta Beltline Community Benefits, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS 
BLOG, May 19, 2008 (updated Aug. 16, 2009), http://communitybenefits. 
blogspot.com/2008/05/atlanta-beltline-community-benefits.html.  
105
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(a)(4) (2008). 
106
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(a)(2) (2008) (defining “affecting 
facility”). 
107
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(b)(1) (2008). 
108
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(a)(1). 
109
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(b)(1). 
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of biking and walking trails, staffing for parks, urban forestry, 
support for community gardens or any other negotiated benefit 
to the environment in the environmental justice community.”
110
 
The developer is also required to file a “meaningful public 
participation plan,”
111
 which should cover issues relating to 
“appropriate opportunities” for public participation, methods for 
seeking out and facilitating public input, and assurances that 




2. Sustainable Development and  
Pedestrian/Transit Oriented Design 
As the public’s awareness of sustainability issues has grown 
in recent years, planners have increasingly begun to incorporate 
into community plans provisions encouraging green building, 
energy and water efficiency, alternative transportation and 
alternative energy.
113
 CBAs, too, have attempted to address 
many of these issues. 
The most common sustainability features found in CBAs 
relate to green building standards. Typically, they require the 
developer to meet the eligibility requirements for LEED 
certification.
114
 Some require actual certification, usually at the 
Silver level or lower, while others require only that the project 
be eligible for LEED certification.
115
 Specific green building 
                                                          
110
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(c). 
111
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(b)(1) (2008). 
112
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-20a(a)(3) (2008) (defining “meaningful 
public participation”). 
113
Salkin, supra note 46. 
114
U.S. Green Building Council, LEED, http://www.usgbc.org/Display 
Page.aspx?CategoryID=19 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
115
 See, e.g., Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91 (requiring LEED 
silver); Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 17 (requiring LEED certification); 
LAX CBA, supra note 95, at 29 (requiring LEED to the extent practicable); 
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 8 (requiring LEED or Minnesota 
standards); Gateway CBA, supra note 97, at 31 (requiring LEED Silver 
goal); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 32 (requiring minimum LEED 
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features may also be set forth in the CBA, whether part of the 
LEED system or not. The Ballpark Village CBA, for example, 
requires that windows must use bird-reflective glass,
116
 and the 
Columbia University CBA specifies that the university will 
“evaluate the use of green roof technology and managed 
vegetated areas” as a way to control storm water runoff.
117
 
The Minneapolis Longfellow Station CBA stands out as an 
example of sustainability planning in CBAs because of its 
emphasis on transit oriented design (TOD) and amenities for 
pedestrians and bicyclists. Similar to the broad goals and 
principles that are typically included in comprehensive plans, the 
CBA recites a list of guiding TOD principles,
118
 as well as more 
specific project requirements. In order to promote alternative 
transportation and advance the project’s TOD goals, the 
developer agreed in the CBA to provide free one-month transit 
passes to residential tenants and to ensure that transit fare can be 
purchased onsite.
119
 The development must also include bicycle 
storage and parking facilities, and dedicated parking spaces for 
Zipcars.
120
 To discourage automobile use, the CBA limits 
parking to a maximum of one space per residential unit and 4.5 
spaces for every 1,000 square feet of commercial space, and it 
requires parking spaces to be leased separately from residential 
units.
121
 Walkability and “placemaking” principles are also 
included in the Longfellow Station CBA to promote human scale 
                                                          
silver); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 5 (requiring LEED certified 
minimum, developer must try for better); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 
95, at 35 (requiring “prudent environmentally sound building practices”). 
116
Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 7.  It also requires pest 
management, including using naturally pest-repellent vegetation and less toxic 
pesticides. Id. at 31. 
117
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 34. 
118
Longfelllow CBA, supra note 95, at 5–6. The guiding principles 
include: urban intensity; height, density, and public/green space; economic 
vitality; urban form; urban uses; retail location; reverse the normal parking 
rules; walkability; transit connectivity; and neighborhood connectivity. 
119
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 14. 
120
Id. at 14–15 
121
Id. at 14–15 
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design.
122





 landscaped public gathering spaces,
125
 and 
safety measures such as traffic calming infrastructure.
126
 
Sustainability principles also play a significant role in the 
Columbia University CBA, which states that: 
In decisions regarding the Project Area, [the university] shall 
be guided by the following goals: protecting the biosphere; the 
sustainable use of renewable natural resources; the reduction of 
waste and the safe disposal of waste; energy conservation; 
greenhouse gas emission reduction; environmental risk reduction 
to [Columbia] staff, students and the surrounding community; 
and correcting damage, if any; reducing the use of products that 
cause environmental damage; and reducing impacts to air quality 
in the surrounding area, with a particular sensitivity to the 
impacts to people suffering from asthma.
127
  
Among other things, the CBA includes promises to use 
energy efficient appliances, mitigate the heat island effect, 
reduce storm water runoff, and plant street trees.
128
  
                                                          
122
Id. at 18–19. Pedestrian-scale design requirements are also included in 
the Gateway Center at Terminal Market CBA. Gateway Center CBA, supra 
note 97, at 32–33, 35 (providing specifically for street trees, lighting, wide 
sidewalks). 
123
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 15.  
124
Id. at 16; see also Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 7 
(providing for way-finding signs). 
125
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 16–17. 
126
Id. at 14–15. 
127
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 32.  
128
Id. at 32–33; see also Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 7 
(providing for “commercially feasible” development of passive infiltration for 
storm water); SunQuest, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 3, 
http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?id=1474 [hereinafter 
SunQuest CBA] (requiring roofs and pavement must be light in color to avoid 
the heat island effect); Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 10–11 
(ensuring construction of permeable sidewalks). 
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3. Community Facilities and  
Neighborhood Improvements 
Comprehensive plans often contain a community facilities 
element that discusses public buildings, infrastructure, and 
“those facilities that contribute to the cultural life or physical 
and mental health and personal growth of a local government’s 
residents (e.g., hospitals, clinics, libraries, and arts centers).”
129
 
Most CBAs include some type of community amenity that would 
fall within this planning area, such as dedicated space and 







 child care facilities
133
 and medical 
                                                          
129
GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-111. 
130
See, e.g., Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 6, 9–10 (5,000 
square feet for community nonprofits and community events; $200,000 for a 
community center and Vietnamese cultural center); Longfellow CBA, supra 
note 95, at 17 (space for public information display, a community room for 
meeting, and 500 square feet for nonprofits at reduced rent); Columbia CBA, 
supra note 95, at 38–39 (space for Community Board 9); MARLTON SQUARE 
REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT DEVELOPER COMMUNITY BENEFITS PROGRAM 3, 
available at http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/cba_marlton 
square.pdf (space for community meetings and other community activities); 
Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 11 (commitment to assist YMCA to 
develop and sustain a multi-purpose center for youth, family and seniors in 
the community); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 28 (developer will 
provide child care, youth and senior centers). 
131
Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 9 ($50,000 for right of way 
improvements); SunQuest CBA, supra note 128, at 4–5 ($150,000 for a 
neighborhood improvement fund; youth center). 
132
Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-2–3 (needs assessment and $1 
million for parks; street level public plaza); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, 
at 16–17 (landscaped public gathering places); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra 
note 95, at 30 (6 acres of open space). 
133
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 38 (5,000 square feet for a 
nonprofit day care center for income eligible families); North Hollywood 
Mixed-Use Redevelopment Project, COMMUNITY BENEFITS PROGRAM 2 (Nov. 
2001), available at http://amy.m.lavine.googlepages.com/NoHo20CBA.pdf 
(developer will build onsite childcare center, find a tenant, and require the 
tenant to provide care for at least 50 low-moderate income families).  
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centers.
134
 Several CBAs also require the developer to either 
market project space to businesses needed by the community, 
such as grocery stores and banks,
135
 or to restrict the availability 
of project space to businesses like pawnshops that have been 




Housing is an important component in both comprehensive 
plans
137
 and CBAs. When CBAs cover projects involving 
substantial housing components, they typically require the 
developer to build more affordable units than would otherwise 
be required.
138
 As an alternative to including affordable housing 
                                                          
134
See, e.g., Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 39 (funding to expand 
existing medical facilities); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 26 
(developing a health care center providing comprehensive quality primary 
care). 
135
Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91, at 9 (developer will market space 
to traditional banks); Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 8 ($2 million for a 
grocery store that must include a pharmacy and a selection of healthy foods); 
Ballpark  Village CBA, supra note 92, at 12 (developer will use good faith 
efforts to rent to a grocery store).  
136
See Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 7 (no payday lenders or 
pawnshops); Pacoima CBA, supra note 95 (no payday lenders); Gateway 
Center CBA, supra note 97, at 34 (no Wal-Mart); Ballpark Village CBA, 
supra note 92, at 18 (no hotel); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 12–13 
(no big boxes or stores that do not accept food stamps); Front Range 
Economic Strategy Center, GATES-CHEROKEE REDEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
BENEFITS AGREEMENT (2008), http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/ 
01/gates-cherokee-redevelopment-cba.html [hereinafter Gates Cherokee CBA] 
(no big boxes). 
137
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at ch. 4 
(housing element). 
138
See Steve Brandt, Minneapolis Neighborhood Makes a Deal and 
History, STARTRIBUNE.COM, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/ 
local/16240642.html (noting that the Longfellow Station CBA requires more 
affordable housing than the Minneapolis inclusionary zoning ordinance). If a 
project is not subject to inclusionary housing minimums, CBAs generally call 
for the developer to maximize the amount of affordable housing included in 
the project. See, e.g., Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 8 (200 of 400 
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within the project, some developers have committed to building 
offsite affordable housing in order to mitigate the displacement 
and/or gentrification caused by the project.
139
  
Most CBA housing provisions specify levels of housing 
affordability and the length of time for which units must remain 
affordable.
140
 Some provide requirements for the types of 
                                                          
units must be affordable); Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-9 (20% 
affordable); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (30% affordable housing); 
Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (10% of for sale units and 20% of 
rental units); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 10 (developer will 
maximize affordable housing). 
139
See, e.g., Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 10 ($20 million for 
affordable housing to address the impact of the project); Ballpark Village 
CBA, supra note 92, at 11 ($1.5 million for affordable housing in 
neighboring communities); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 8 ($27.3 
million for a “Community First Housing Fund” to buy market rate properties 
inside and outside the project for income eligible residents); Grand Avenue 
Committee, GRAND AVENUE COMMUNITY BENEFITS PROJECT (2008), 
http://www. 
grandavenuecommittee.org/community.html [hereinafter Grand Avenue] 
(revolving loan fund of at least $750,000 for affordable housing 
development); Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-11 ($650,000 revolving loan 
fund for affordable housing development).  
140
Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 9 (120 of the 200 units must 
be affordable at AMI 50% and the other 80 must be affordable at AMI 80%; 
50 years affordability); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 7 (providing a 
schedule of housing affordability requirements); Grand Avenue, supra note 
139 (half of the affordable units will be priced at not more than 80% AMI, 
and the other half at 50%; affordability is required for 55 years for rental 
units and 45 years for for sale units); Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-10 
(30% of affordable units will be for 50% AMI, 35% will be for 51–60% 
AMI, and 35% will be for 61–80% AMI; minimum 30 years affordability); 
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (20% of all units to be affordable at 
50% AMI and 10% to be affordable at 40–60% AMI; affordability required 
for 30 years); Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (units must remain 
affordable for at least 40 years); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 10 
(average AMI of affordable units can be no more than 47%); Atlantic Yards 
CBA, supra note 95, at 24 (units are to be affordable for 30 years); Oak to 
Ninth Community Benefits Coalition and the Redevelopment Agency, OAK TO 
NINTH COOPERATION AGREEMENT, at 3 (2006) http://www.urbanstrategies. 
org/programs/econopp/documents/FinalOaktoNinthCooperationAgreeementwit
hCoalitionfinalexecution.pdf [hereinafter Oak to Ninth CBA] (“[A]ll Project 
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affordable units to be included in the development (e.g., 
different unit sizes, rental versus for sale units, senior restricted 
housing, etc.)
141
 and the location of affordable units, both in 
relation to the project and in relation to other affordable housing 
units.
142
 Other CBAs give preferences for affordable units to 
people displaced by the project, low-income residents or local 
residents.
143
 CBAs may also seek to expedite the construction of 
                                                          
Units shall be provided at no greater than an Affordable Rent to households 
earning from 25 percent to 60 percent of Area Median Income for at least 55 
years.”). 
141
See, e.g., Oak to Ninth CBA, supra note 140, at 3 (no more than 
25% of affordable units can be senior restricted, at least 30% must be three-
bedroom units, and at least 20% must be two-bedroom units); Longfellow 
CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (requiring a mix of studios, and one, two and three 
bedroom units); Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (requiring 10% of for 
sale units and 20% of rentals to be affordable); Dearborn Street CBA, supra 
note 91 (requiring 50 units of affordable “family housing”); Ballpark Village 
CBA, supra note 92, at 10–11 (some units in the offsite affordable housing 
project must be reserved for seniors); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 
25 (10% of affordable units reserved for seniors); Hunters Point CBA, supra 
note 91, at 9–10 (average affordable unit size of 2.5 bedrooms and requiring 
some units to be for seniors or disabled residents). 
142
See, e.g., Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (prohibiting any one 
building from containing more than 65% affordable housing so as “to prevent 
a concentration of affordable housing in any particular building in the 
development”); Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (buildings are to be 
inclusionary); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 10 (75% of the 
affordable units at one building will be 2 or 3 bedroom units, other building 
will be devoted to single rooms and transitional housing); Staples CBA, supra 
note 91, at A-10 (affordable units will be either on or offsite, but offsite units 
will be within a 3 mile radius); Oak to Ninth CBA, supra note 140, at 5 
(permitting the redevelopment agency to construct a maximum of 77 offsite 
affordable units and limiting them to the immediate area). 
143
See, e.g., Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-16 (giving priority given 
to displaced residents); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 11 (requiring 
that 10% of the restricted units will be targeted to households with at least 
one person who has worked in downtown San Diego for one year, 60% shall 
be targeted to people from neighboring communities, 30% may be targeted to 
anybody); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 9–10 (requiring priority 
marketing for the affordable units for existing local residents, displaced 
residents, etc.); Grand Avenue, supra note 139 (giving priority for rentals for 
displaced residents). 
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affordable units by requiring them to be finished before work is 
started on other parts of the project.
144
  
5. Aesthetics and Building Design 
Community character is often shaped by a neighborhood’s 
“look,” and for this reason, aesthetics and architecture often 
play a role in community planning.
145
 While most CBAs do not 
contain detailed aesthetic or design regulations, a number of 
CBAs do address specific aesthetic issues. Several include 
limitations on signs and blank facades, both of which can give a 
community a dull or garish appearance.
146
 For similar reasons, 
the Pacoima Plaza CBA prohibits barred windows,
147
 the 
Peninsula Compost CBA requires project facilities to be 
screened from view,
148
 and the Longfellow Station agreement 
prohibits vinyl siding and drive through windows.
149
 
In contrast to these preemptive measures, other CBAs 
include provisions intended to affirmatively foster community 
character, such as space and funding requirements for public 
                                                          
144
See, e.g., Oak to Ninth CBA, supra note 140, at 5 (requiring 
construction of any offsite units to be commenced prior to commercial parts 
of the project); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 7; Dearborn Street 
CBA, supra note 91, at 8 (stating the city will not be obligated to grant a 
certificate of occupancy for the retail space until the developers can show that 
construction has commenced on at least 200 housing units, including at least 
80 affordable units; developer agrees that within 4 years of the issuance of 
the certificate of occupancy, construction must be commenced on the other 
200 units). 
145
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-
168 to 7-172 (community design element). 
146
Gateway Center CBA, supra note 97, at 32 (requiring that there not 
be any blank walls); Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 6 (requiring 
facades of stores are unique and distinct and specific sign restrictions); 
Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 6. 
147
Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91, at 7.  
148
See also Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 19 (requiring screening 
of machinery, loading docks, and trash areas). 
149
Id.  
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art.
150
 Recognizing the unique character of Seattle’s Little Saigon 
neighborhood, the Dearborn CBA (although the project was later 
cancelled
151
) included $200,000 for the construction of a 
Vietnamese cultural center, and provisions intended to help 
existing small businesses run by Vietnamese merchants.
152
 
Similarly, Columbia agreed to preserve several of the 
neighborhood’s historic buildings and to help create a multi-
disciplinary historic preservation and development strategy.
153
  
“Placemaking” is an important part of the Longfellow 
Station CBA. While the design guides are in part intended to 
promote walking and transit use, as noted above, they are also 
intended to “encourage interaction and connection at a human 
scale . . . through creation of a welcoming, safe, and accessible 
environment.”
154
 The project is to “be urban, not suburban, in 
feel and function” and buildings must be “designed to have a 
pedestrian feel at street level. Scale, massing and relationships 
of buildings shall be designed to relate to the users (not 
overwhelm the users).”
155
 Additionally, the project is to be 
designed so as to facilitate outdoor dining and shopping, and 
high quality exterior building materials are required in order to 
                                                          
150
See, e.g., Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91 (developer will comply 
with CRA’s public art policy); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 36 (5,000 
square feet of space for use by local artists); Ballpark Village CBA, supra 
note 92, at 12 (requires a good faith effort to use local artists); Longfellow 
CBA, supra note 95, at 17 (space for public art). 
151
Emily Heffter, $300M Project at Seattle Goodwill Site Canceled, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ 
localnews/2009116421_webgoodwill24.html.  
152
Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 6, 9–10 (70,000 square feet 
set aside for small retail stores that each occupy less than 5,000 square feet 
and at least 5,000 square feet to one or more non-profit organizations who 
primarily provide services to the Vietnamese Community); see also Stuart 




Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 39–40. 
154
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 18.  
155
Id. at 19. 
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establish “a sense of permanency.”
156
 
6. Parking & Traffic 
CBAs do not generally include detailed transportation plans, 
but some agreements have included provisions relating to 
parking, traffic and transit facilities. (Unlike the TOD provisions 
described above, which are intended to promote transit and 
discourage driving, these transportation requirements are aimed 
at mitigating congestion and improving infrastructure.) Examples 
of transportation-related community benefits include the 
establishment of a residential parking permit program,
157
 the 
construction of additional parking facilities,
158
 and subway, bus 
stop and other infrastructure improvements.
159
 The Columbia 
CBA also authorizes funding for a transportation needs 
assessment study, which may cover such issues as public 




7. Small Business Development 
Comprehensive plans frequently address economic 
development,
161
 and “[a] growing number of communities are 
including in their comprehensive plans an intention to preserve 
and strengthen locally owned businesses, limit commercial 
development to the downtown or other existing retail districts, 




See, e.g., Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-3. 
158
See, e.g., Peninsula Compost CBA, supra note 95, at 4 
(neighborhood parking lot); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 36 (adding 72 
public parking spaces). 
159
See, e.g., Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 9 ($150,000 for 
traffic mitigation); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 35–36 (subway and bus 
stop improvements). 
160
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 35. 
161
See, e.g., GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, 
at 7-127 to 7-135. 
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and restrict the proliferation of corporate chains.”
162
 With or 
without the guidance of such policies, community coalitions have 
often sought CBA benefits to encourage the growth of small and 
local businesses. 
Many CBAs set goals for awarding contracts to local 
businesses, and these provisions usually include a preference for 
minority and women owned businesses—frequently referred to 
as minority-owned business enterprises (“MBEs”), women-
owned business enterprises (“WBEs”) or minority-women-
owned business enterprises (“MWBEs”).
163
  CBAs relating to 
projects with retail or commercial components have included 
space set-asides for small and local businesses
164
 and in a few 
CBAs, big boxes and large chain stores have been effectively 
prohibited by retail size caps.
165
  
                                                          
162
See New Rules, Comprehensive Plans, http://www.newrules.org/ 
retail/rules/comprehensive-plans (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
163
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 17–18 (goals to 
award at least 5% of preconstruction contracts (e.g., architectural, 
engineering, legal) to MBEs and 3% to WBEs (by total value of contracts), 
goals to award at least 20% of construction contracts to MBEs and 10% to 
WBEs (by total value of contracts), with a preference for community based 
businesses, goals to award at least 20% of post construction purchasing and 
service contracts to MWBEs). 
164
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 19 (15% set aside 
for small businesses, with below market rents); Dearborn Street CBA, supra 
note 91, at 6 (70,000 square feet set aside for small retail stores greater than 
5,000 square feet and at least two non-formula businesses); Gateway Center 
CBA, supra note 97, at 29 (18,000 square feet for small businesses); 
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 12–13 (national chains can occupy no 
more than 70% of the project and 10% must be reserved for “community 
based small businesses”); San Jose CIM Project Community Benefits 
Agreement 121–22 (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.communitybenefits.org/ 
article.php?id=1476 (goals of 30% San Jose retailers and 30% regional 
retailers, with a set aside of 10% of the available retail space for existing 
small business in the downtown); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 22 
(18,000 square foot set aside for small businesses). 
165
See, e.g., Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136, at 2 (size cap at 
75,000 square feet); Gateway Center CBA, supra note 97 (manuscript at 34) 
(no Wal-Mart); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 19 (large retail cap at 
30,000 square feet); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 22 (retail rental size 
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Other benefits to small and local businesses include low 
interest loan programs,
166
 provisions requiring contracts to be 
unbundled (to level the playing field for smaller businesses),
167
 
and programs to better inform local businesses about the 
project’s business opportunities.
168
 The Penguins Arena CBA, for 
example, will seek to increase community business involvement 
in the project by requiring the developer to notify the coalition 
of pre-bid activities and meetings with contractors. Local 
business owners will also be invited to business opportunity 
workshops provided by the Penguins, which will help them to 
take advantage of opportunities for concessions, retail space, 
suppliers, vendors and subcontractors.
169
  
IV. DO PRIVATE CBAS USURP THE PUBLIC PLANNING PROCESS? 
The inclusion in CBAs of community amenities that resemble 
items normally found in comprehensive plans and/or 
implementing regulations raises a number of critical community 
planning issues that have not yet been addressed.   
A. Are CBAs Another Type of Community-Based Plan? 
When considered as a whole, CBAs are not synonymous 
with comprehensive land use plans or smaller scale community-
based plans. CBAs involve issues not contemplated by planning 
documents, such as increased wage requirements, union 
neutrality, local hiring goals, and job training programs. These 
provisions, moreover, are core issues of the community benefits 
movement.
170
 CBA coalitions also have the potential to 
                                                          
cap at 2,500 square feet). 
166
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 20; LAX CBA, 
supra note 95, at 31 (revolving loan fund for small businesses).  
167
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 20.  
168
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 20–21 (targeted 
outreach to local small businesses and “Meet the General Contractor” 
meetings, a series of technical assistance workshops for local MWBEs). 
169
See Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 12–13. 
170
See, e.g., CommunityBenefits.org, A New Urban Agenda for 
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encourage more public participation than traditional planning 
processes by building a sense of community empowerment. 
Rather than the development of the community vision being 
facilitated by a government employed planning staff, CBAs are 
usually developed and facilitated by members of the impacted 
community.
171
 Community-based planning and coalition 
organizing have much in common, however, as both seek out 
diverse stakeholders using non-conventional outreach techniques.  
As project-specific documents, the impact of CBAs is also 
spatially limited,
172
 unlike comprehensive plans, which apply to 
                                                          
America: Rebuild the Middle Class, http://communitybenefits.org/downloads/ 
A%20New%20Urban%20Agenda%20for%20America.pdf (last visited Oct. 
15, 2009) (“The standard menu of progressive urban policy initiatives focuses 
on addressing identified needs of poor families by reestablishing the social 
safety net and improving job training and education programs. The new 
urban agenda adds an important and often missing component by addressing 
one of the main causes of urban poverty: the prevalence of low-paying, low-
quality employment and the dearth of middle-class job opportunities.”). 
171
However, in states where the government is more directly involved 
with CBAs, such as in California, the planning staff may be more intimately 
involved in the process. For example, staff at the Los Angeles Community 
Redevelopment Agency are routinely involved in the development of CBAs.  
172
The requirement that CBAs be limited to one development is intended 
to distinguish the tool from:  
redevelopment plans, general plans, specific plans, zoning laws, and 
other land use documents that might encourage or require specified 
community benefits for particular geographic areas. This requirement 
also excludes from the definition of CBA single-issue policies that 
cover a range of projects, such as typical inclusionary housing 
policies or local hiring policies. 
Gross, supra note 3, at 39. However, legislative CBA provisions may require 
multiple developers to provide specific community benefits lobbied for by the 
community, as in the Milwaukee Park East Redevelopment Compact. This 
document requires the developers of county-owned land to provide living 
wages and job training programs, and to use green building techniques. Park 
East Redevelopment Compact, supra note 91. See also Amy Lavine, 
Milwaukee Park East Redevelopment CBA, COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
AGREEMENTS BLOG, http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/01/ 
milwaukee-park-east-redevelopment-cba.html (Jan. 3, 2008). Alternatively, a 
legislative CBA provision may require multiple developers to negotiate CBAs 
in the future. This approach was taken in relation to Atlanta’s Beltline 
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all of the residents and businesses in a given city or metropolitan 
area. CBAs that involve commitments of planning-related 
amenities and accommodations may be placed on the spectrum 
close to small-scale comprehensive plans, especially when they 
include the types of broad policy statements that are commonly 
used to guide community-based plans. 
Despite the similarities between CBAs and small-scale 
community-based plans, the unregulated CBA negotiation 
process should not be permitted to displace thorough and 
accountable government planning. In this regard, the CBA for 
Atlantic Yards, a proposed arena project and mega-development 
located in Brooklyn, has been particularly maligned. The CBA 
has demonstrated that specious appearances of community 
involvement can legitimate departures from the normal planning 
process when, in fact, the CBA’s effect may be to make 
development projects less accountable, less transparent, and 
more exclusionary than they otherwise would be.  
In the case of Atlantic Yards, the project’s government 
partner, a state economic development authority, overrode all of 
the local zoning and planning laws in order to expedite the 
development.
173
 As a result, the project’s approval was left 
primarily to the state authority’s unelected board,
174
 with no city 
                                                          
project, requiring developers that accept financial incentives to “reflect, 
through the development agreements or funding agreements that accompany 
such projects, certain community benefit principles[.]” ATLANTA, GA., 
ORDINANCE 05-O-1733 § 19 (2005). 
173
Lance Freeman, Atlantic Yards and the Perils of Community Benefits 
Agreements, PLANETIZEN, May 5, 2007, http://www.planetizen.com/node/ 
24335. Authority for the override of local zoning and planning laws is found 
in the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. 
UNCONSOL. LAW § 6255 (2006). 
174
The project also required a land deal with the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, another unelected authority, as well as approvals 
from the Public Authorities Control Board (“PACB”), which does include 
several representatives from the state legislature. See N.Y. State Gov’t 
website, About the Public Authorities Control Board, http://www.budget. 
state.ny.us/agencyGuide/pacb/aboutPACB.html. The PACB’s role is limited, 
however, to approving project financing; it is not authorized to make 
planning and development decisions.  
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officials ever having had a chance to review the project and 
condition or reject it.
175
 The CBA, moreover, was finalized 
before an environmental impact statement had been prepared for 
the project, meaning that the CBA signatories may have been 
unaware of the extent of the project’s impacts.
176
 
The Atlantic Yards CBA does include promises of significant 
community amenities, such as hundreds of affordable housing 
units, open space, job training, and a health center, but it has 
been widely criticized as being unrepresentative of the 
community.
177
 Negotiations were conducted secretly, with many 
                                                          
175
Normally, the city’s uniform land use review process would give local 
community boards, the borough president, the planning commission, and the 
city council a chance to review the development application. New York City 
Dept. of City Planning, The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009). 
176
The Atlantic Yards CBA was signed in 2005. Atlantic Yards CBA, 
supra note 95, at 1. The EIS was adopted in 2006. New York State’s Empire 
State Development, Atlantic Yards Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(DEIS)—July 18, 2006, http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_Projects/ 
Data/AtlanticYards/AdditionalResources/AYDEIS/AYDEIS.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2010). FEIS was adopted on November 27, 2006. New York State’s 
Empire State Development, Atlantic Yards Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (FEIS)—Corrected and Amended November 27, 2006, 
http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_Projects/Data/AtlanticYards/Addi
tionalResources/AYFEIS/AYFEIS.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).  
177
Only eight community groups joined the CBA coalition, as compared 
to the more than 50 groups that are opposed to the project. Develop—Don’t 
Destroy Brooklyn, The Opposition, http://dddb.net/php/opposition.php (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2009) (listing opposition groups). Testimony made on behalf 
of Good Jobs New York recognized that “[p]erhaps the most striking is that 
elsewhere CBAs are negotiated by one broad coalition of groups that would 
otherwise oppose a project, a coalition that includes labor and community 
organizations representing a variety of interests . . . . In the BAY [Brooklyn 
Atlantic Yards] case, several groups, all of which have publicly supported the 
project already, have each engaged in what seem to be separate negotiations 
on particular issues.” Public Hearing of the New York City Council Comm. 
on Econ. Dev. on the Proposed Brooklyn Atlantic Yards Project (May 26, 
2005) (comments of Bettina Damiani, Project Dir., Good Jobs New York), 
available at http://www.goodjobsny.org/testimony_bay_5_05.htm [hereinafter 
Damiani testimony]; see also Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, Where is 
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stakeholders excluded, and all of the coalition community groups 
have received funding from the developer.
178
 Additionally, some 




For the community groups that were not given a chance to 
participate in defining the developer’s public responsibilities—
and there are many such groups
180
—the CBA was a wholly 
                                                          
the Community in “CBA”?, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.dddb.net/php/ 
latestnews_Linked.php?id=696. 
178
See, e.g., Damiani testimony, supra note 177, (“The negotiations 
surrounding the development of the BAY project have been marked by 
secrecy . . . . Unsurprisingly, this process has contributed to a fragmentation 
of community responses, as some groups have been able to work with the 
‘designated developer’ to advance their concerns while others have not.”); 
Jess Wisloski, Ratner Invites Chosen Few to Draft Agreement, BROOKLYN 
PAPER, Oct. 2, 2004, http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/27/38/ 
27_38nets2.html (discussing the secrecy and exclusivity of CBA 
negotiations); Norman Oder, Atlantic Yards Process a “Modern Blueprint”? 
Only if the Times Ignores the Evidence, TIMES RATNER REPORT, Oct. 13, 
2005, http://timesratnerreport.blogspot.com/2005/10/atlantic-yards-process-
modern.html) (calling the Atlantic Yards and its CBA “a national model in 
public manipulation and broken promises”); Norman Oder, With $1.5M 
Grant/Loan, FCR Bails Out National ACORN, Parent of Major CBA Partner, 
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Dec. 2, 2008, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot. 
com/2008/12/with-15m-grantloan-fcr-bails-out.html (reporting that the 
developer gave one of the CBA signatories a $1.5 million bailout); Norman 
Oder, AY CBA Witness Bloomberg Blasts CBAs as Extortion; Signatory 
Nimmons Brushes off Questions from The Local, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, 
Aug. 26, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/08/ay-cba-
witness-bloomberg-blasts-cbas-as.html (“On July 22, Forest City Ratner 
executive Mary Anne Gilmartin confirmed at a public meeting that the 
developer provides funds to all of the signatories of the Community Benefits 
Agreement.”).  
179
See, e.g., Norman Oder, More Criticism of the Atlantic Yards 
Community Benefits Agreement: It (Mostly) Doesn’t Apply if Ratner Sells the 
Project, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Mar. 30, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport 
.blogspot.com/2009/03/more-criticism-of-atlantic-yards.html (explaining that 
many provisions in the CBA would not apply if the developer were to sell the 
project). Additionally, it is not clear that the CBA, and especially its 
affordable housing promises, would be enforceable if only the arena were to 
be built.  
180
See, e.g., The Opposition, supra note 177 (listing opposition groups). 
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inadequate substitute for the city’s land use review process, even 
if that process is not ideal for large scale developments.
181
 As 
urban planning professor Lance Freeman has explained: 
While the CBA does at least give some of the most 
disenfranchised residents an opportunity to reap some 
benefits from the project . . . there is no mechanism to 
insure that the “community” in a CBA is representative 
of the community. If the signatories to the CBA were 
simply viewed as another interest group, that might be 
ok. But the CBA is being presented as illustrative of the 
development’s community input. Public officials are 
posing for pictures with the developer and signatories to 
the CBA, giving the impression that the community had 
significant input into the planning [of] Atlantic Yards. 
This is not necessarily the case. 
[T]he CBA . . . cannot be viewed as a substitute for a 
true planning process that includes community input. If a 
developer is proposing a project that will unduly burden 
                                                          
181
See, e.g., Norman Oder, Catching Up with Coney Island: How CBA-
like Trade-offs May Have Sacrificed the Amusement Area, ATLANTIC YARDS 
REPORT, Aug. 7, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/08/ 
catching-up-with-coney-island-how-cba.html (noting that the city’s uniform 
land use review process failed to “resolve opposing views” regarding the 
Coney Island rezoning); Norman Oder, Flashback, 2005: Roger Green Says 
AY Area “Not Blighted;” Academic Says AY a Far Cry from Times Square 
Blight, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Feb. 19, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport. 
blogspot.com/2009/02/flashback-2005-roger-green-says-ay-area.html (quoting 
state Assemblyman Daniel O’Donnell as calling the city’s planning review 
process a “horse and pony show” because the city council often ignores the 
recommendations of local community boards); Norman Oder, HPD Official 
Says Development Trade-offs Should Be Transparent (and Implicitly Indicts 
the AY Approval Process), ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Nov. 7, 2008, 
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/11/hpd-official-says-development 
-trade.html (quoting an official from the city Department of Housing 
Preservation as explaining that “ULURP is awfully late to start a 
conversation about a large project. It’s one thing if you’re talking about a 
small project, and you’re going to tweak a floor . . . or affordability, 
slightly. If you’re talking about a large-scale project, ULURP is simply too 
late to really have that dialogue”). 
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the community, exacting benefits in exchange for 
tolerating these burdens is fine idea. Ideally, this would 
be done as part of a democratic planning process. When 
negotiated by private organizations, however, this is 
symptomatic of a flawed planning process. When CBAs 
are used in place of an inclusive planning process they 
run the risk of legitimating the very process they are 




Since the Atlantic Yards CBA was signed in 2005, public 
officials involved in the Atlantic Yards development have 
admitted that the project should have gone through the local 
planning process.
183
 Mayor Bloomberg, who enthusiastically 
endorsed the CBA in 2005 has now come full circle, stating that 
he is “violently opposed to community benefits agreements” and 
that a “small group of people, [who] feather their own 
nests. . . [and] extort money from the developer” is “just not 
good government.”
184
 Even the developer has removed the CBA 
                                                          
182
Freeman, supra note 173 (emphasis added); see also Norman Oder, 
Push for AY Development Trust Begins; How Much Power Would it Have?, 
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, June 17, 2008, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot. 
com/2008/06/push-for-ay-development-trust-begins.html (quoting a city 
council member as remarking that “[t]he fundamental mistake that was made 
here, really the original [mistake] of this project, is that it was approved in a 
way that went around all the usual process[es] for approving a big project . . 
. . We never had a chance to fix all the problems.”); Norman Oder, 
ACORN’s Lewis Gets Fiery as “Affordable Housing” Debate Heats Up, 
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Mar. 1, 2006, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot. 
com/2006/03/acorns-lewis-gets-fiery-as-affordable.html (commenting on the 
controversy that the CBA and the lack of local review has engendered, law 
professor Vicki Been opined that “[o]ne of the take home messages is we 
need to use this opportunity to figure out how to fix the [planning] system 
more broadly so we’re not having these kinds of fights later in the year or 
decades”). 
183
See, e.g., Norman Oder, After Doctoroff Admits AY Should’ve Gone 
Through ULURP, Will Bloomy, Burden Follow?, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, 
Dec. 12, 2007, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2007/12/after-doctor 
off-admits-ay-shouldve-gone.html. 
184
Norman Oder, AY CBA Witness Bloomberg Blasts CBAs as Extortion; 
Signatory Nimmons Brushes Off Questions from The Local, ATLANTIC YARDS 
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from its website,
185
 which at one point prominently displayed 
information about the project’s community benefits.
186
  
This CBA experience is used to demonstrate that not all 
CBAs are “textbook” illustrations of the true benefits of 
meaningful CBA processes and results. In some cases, it is 
possible that the CBA framework could provide a viable 
alternative to more conventional planning techniques. But, as 
illustrated by this example, such a process is susceptible to 
capture and manipulation. 
B. Do CBAs Advance Narrow Interests at the Expense of the 
Larger Community? 
While comprehensive land use plans are designed to benefit 
the community as a whole, and community-based plans are 
generally intended to be incorporated into more general planning 
documents, CBAs are negotiated to benefit small neighborhoods 
within a metropolitan area. Because of their targeted focus, it 
has occasionally been contended that CBA coalitions divert 
resources for themselves at the expense of the larger 
community. When projects covered by CBAs receive significant 




                                                          
REPORT, Aug. 26, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/08/ay-
cba-witness-bloomberg-blasts-cbas-as.html. 
185
See Barclay’s Center Brooklyn, http://www.barclayscenter.com (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2009). 
186
The developer, in fact, touted the CBA in many of the project’s 
promotional materials.  See, e.g., Norman Oder, In Seventh Slick Brochure, 
Forest City Ratner Touts “Historic” CBA, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Mar. 
3, 2008, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/03/in-seventh-slick-
brochure-forest-city.html (discussing a brochure calling the CBA “historic”). 
187
See Matthew Schuerman, The C.B.A. at Atlantic Yards: But Is It 
Legal?, N.Y. OBSERVER, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/ 
34377 (“Carl Weisbrod, the former president of the city Economic 
Development Corporation, criticized the use of CBA’s in projects that receive 
public funds—one of which is Atlantic Yards—as fundamentally 
undemocratic. ‘If the public is putting money into the project and the 
developer is allocating that money in private deals with the community, it is 
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CBA supporters have made persuasive arguments against this 
premise, explaining that CBAs can produce social and economic 
goods that ultimately benefit their surrounding regions. As 
explained by the Partnership for Working Families, a national 
organization that promotes CBAs, “Community benefits tools 
maximize returns on local government investments . . . . 
Community benefits programs can transform regions through 
stronger, more equitable economies . . . . The community 
benefits model works for developers, too . . . . Public input 
results in better projects that benefit the whole community . . . . 
Community benefits are part of a smart growth agenda.”
188
 
Indeed, the CBA framework is inherently pro-development, and 
it can help to obtain project approvals where NIMBYism might 
otherwise prevail.
189
 Additionally, CBAs, like development 
agreements,
190
 can add a measure of certainty to development 
projects by setting up mechanisms to resolve community 
concerns that might arise during buildout, before they ripen into 
public opposition or litigation.
191
 
As with the question of whether CBAs distort the planning 
                                                          
not government setting the priorities. Generally speaking, it is city taxpayer 
dollars that are being spent in not necessarily high priority areas,’ he said. ‘It 
shouldn’t be some local community groups making these decisions. It should 
be a cross-section of the community and city government.’”). 
188
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, COMMUNITY BENEFITS: 




See, e.g., id. at 3 (“CBA advocates are pro-growth . . . . Once an 
agreement is achieved, the developer can feel confident that they [sic] have 
real community support [for] the project, easing the approvals process for 
everyone.”). 
190
See Michael B. Kent, Jr., Forming a Tie That Binds: Development 
Agreements in Georgia and the Need for Legislative Clarity, 30 ENVIRONS 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 8–9 (2006) (explaining how development 
agreements provide certainty in the land development process). 
191
Most CBAs provide for mediation and/or binding arbitration in the 
case of a dispute between the coalition and the developer. See, e.g., 
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 24 (mediation); LAX CBA, supra note 
95, at 33 (arbitration). 
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process and produce counterproductive results, the effect of a 
CBA on the allocation of metropolitan resources will vary 
depending on the circumstances surrounding its adoption and the 
terms that it embraces. A CBA that is negotiated by a 
historically disempowered community for a development that 
will have significant negative impacts will advance equity and 
fairness goals, rather than inhibit them. But other situations can 
be easily imagined in which CBAs could lead to private 
windfalls and misallocations of public and private resources. 
While this has not been a problem in California, the New York 
CBAs have not demonstrated as much integrity. 
One situation in which CBAs may lead to windfall benefits 
occurs when coalition community groups receive a direct 
financial benefit in exchange for their support of a project. This 
occurred in relation to the Atlantic Yards CBA, as noted above. 
The director of the Partnership for Working Families, 
responding to this situation, stated: “[a]s a matter of principle, 
groups in our network don’t take money from developers. We 
want to avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest . . . .”
192
 
Ideals may be important to the community benefits movement, 
but without conflict of interest regulations to protect the integrity 
of CBAs, the movement will continue to be susceptible to 
developer-coalition collusion.  
It is also possible that communities could demand excessive 
benefits from developers eager to obtain public support and 
quick project approvals. While there is nothing unlawful about 
this in the context of a purely private agreement, especially 
where the community will suffer definite and negative 
development impacts, the effect that such a CBA may have on 
government decision-makers raises ethical and constitutional 
problems. Ethical considerations come into play where coalitions 
are used as a proxy for politicians seeking particular community 
amenities for specific constituent groups. Again, the trouble has 
                                                          
192
Norman Oder, Conflict of Interest? $350K to CBA Signatories Shows 
Departure From L.A. Model, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, June 8, 2006, 
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2006/06/conflict-of-interest-350k-to-
cba.html. 
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been caused by New York CBAs, and similar sorts of 
agreements even prompted a New York City Bar Association 
report in 1988. The report unequivocally counseled against 
permitting CBA-type deals: 
The ad hoc payment of money or services in return for 
favorable governmental action also adversely affects the 
decision-making process. In egregious cases, the decision 
maker is corrupted. In less egregious cases, satisfying the 
wish list for a borough president, community board or a 
mayor enhances the recipient’s political power. The 
decision-maker may accept the project in order to get the 
unrelated amenities, when perhaps it should be voted 
down. Thus integrity is eroded, of the government in 




These ethical concerns also contribute to the reasoning 
behind the Supreme Court’s doctrine prohibiting development 
exactions,
194
 which “has its roots in the allegations of coercion 
and illicit motive that long have animated judicial and academic 
debate about exactions and more generally, about the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”
195
 Development agreements 
permit local governments to avoid the exactions ban by 
negotiating for developer concessions, usually traded for a 
guarantee that zoning and land use regulations will not be 
changed in a manner that prevents successive phases of a 
project. Because these agreements are voluntary, development 
approvals are not considered to be conditioned on the provision 
of development amenities, even if this is the de facto (and often 
desired) result.
196
 Local governments are currently authorized to 
                                                          
193
Matthew Schuerman, C.B.A.’s: Coming to a Bar Near You, N.Y. 
OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/34098. 
194
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
195
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: 
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
473, 475 (1991). 
196
See generally Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 85. 
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enter into development agreements in about a dozen states, but 
such arrangements have also been upheld in states where no 
statutory authority for development agreements exists, as in 
Texas and Massachusetts.
197
 In some states where development 
agreements have not been approved, either by statute or judicial 
fiat, the development process is often dominated by other types 
of negotiated agreements between developers and planning 
entities, often resulting from environmental mitigation measures 
where local environmental review occurs. 
The problem with unauthorized and unregulated bilateral 
government-developer negotiations is that they open up the 
possibility that “‘needy’ cities and towns [may] see their zoning 
powers as for sale to the highest bidder.”
198
 And where this is 
the case, short term economic goals may be just as likely to 
motivate local government decision makers as are the types of 
social and environmental policies that require foresight and long-
term planning.
199
 In the states that have enacted development 
agreement statutes, on the other hand, the comprehensive plan 
acts as a safeguard to ensure that development agreements 
further the community’s broad goals and policies for future 
development.
200
 States such as California, which require 
consistency between zoning and the comprehensive plan, also 
require consistency in the negotiation of development 
agreements. The development agreement framework has also 
allowed planning agencies, community organizations and 
                                                          
197
See Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 340, 338–39 (discussing 
recent Massachusetts cases that “conclude that a promise by a petitioner is 
different from a requirement imposed as a condition precedent by the 
municipality”); Kent, Jr., supra note 190, at 6, n.25 (2006) (citing cases 
permitting development agreements in the absence of enabling legislation 
from Alabama, Nebraska, and New Mexico). 
198
See Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 338. 
199
See Camacho II, supra note 54, at 271 (“While modern bilateral 
negotiation attempts to address some of the intrinsic inefficiencies of the 
traditional command and control approach . . . bilateral negotiation 
approaches promote adversarial and self-interested behavior while ignoring 
the long-term community engagement that is essential to the legitimacy of 
local decision-making processes.”). 
200
Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 345. 
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developers to work together in building CBAs, while in other 
states local governments have struggled to determine where they 
fit into the CBA process. 
Four New York CBAs have been negotiated to date, relating 
to Atlantic Yards, the Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal 
Market, Yankee Stadium, and the expansion of Columbia 
University.
201
 In each of these cases, the lack of strong and 
inclusive community coalitions and the amount of influence 
wielded by public officials suggests that there were, at the very 




                                                          
201
See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 83, at 308–17. 
202
Atlantic Yards continues to be promoted with much zeal by the 
Empire State Development Corporation, even though its public benefits have 
decreased substantially since the project was approved in 2006. Frank Gehry 
is no longer the architect, for example; the project’s affordable housing 
component has been significantly delayed; and a renegotiated land deal with 
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority has resulted in an arguably less 
valuable package for the authority (and for New York City subway riders). In 
May 2009, the New York City Independent Budget Office (“IBO”) concluded 
that changes in the project’s commercial component and increased subsidies 
rendered the arena a net money loser for the city. See Norman Oder, Senate 
Hearing: No Tough Questions for ESDC, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, May 29, 
2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/05/senate-hearing-no-tou 
gh-questions-for.html. Despite this revelation, and despite increasingly loud 
calls for more transparency in the project, the Empire State Development 
Corporation refuses to release its updated cost-benefit analysis until after the 
project’s next board approval. As a result, the public will not get a chance to 
comment on the situation. What’s more, while refusing to provide a 
meaningful response to serious allegations that the project may no longer be 
in the public’s best interest, ESDC has “not looked closely at that [the IBO’s] 
report.” Norman Oder, ESDC, FCR Face, Answer, Evade Tough Questions, 
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, July 23, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot. 
com/2009/07/esdc-fcr-face-answer-evade-tough.html.  
In the Bronx, it was revealed last year that the mayor’s office had 
pressured the Yankees to provide a free luxury suite for the mayor and other 
high-ranking officials. State Senator Richard Brodsky, who has been urging 
reforms, asked “what is the public interest here and who’s protecting it?” 
David W. Chen, City Pressed for Use of Yankee Luxury Suite, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/nyregion/ 
30stadium.html. The project has been riddled with other controversies, from 
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In states that do not allow development agreements, the 
exactions issue also raises the question of the most appropriate 
way for public officials to react when faced with a developer 
that refuses to negotiate a CBA with a strong and broadly 
inclusive CBA coalition: the local official can become involved 
in CBA negotiations and try to persuade the developer into 
negotiating, which might raise exactions problems if that 
persuasion amounts to coercion; or she can remain on the 
sidelines and hope that the parties reach a deal. In Pittsburgh, 
the mayor and county executive became very involved in 
negotiations for the Penguins CBA, to the point where they 
committed $1 million in matching funds to help secure a grocery 
store and YMCA for the community. Both of these facilities are 
sorely needed in the underserved community located near the 
arena site, and the CBA coalition was one of the largest and 
most inclusive coalitions formed to date. In short, this was an 
ideal situation for the negotiation of a CBA. But the city has 
changed its tune toward CBAs since its legal department 
concluded that “[w]hile [CBAs] could provide benefits to the 
community, they are simply not a part of what the Planning 
Commission may consider when reviewing master-development 
plans and project-development plans.”
203
  
                                                          
a U.S. Congressional inquiry to its tax-exempt bonding scheme (which 
resulted in an IRS move to close certain loopholes), to an 18-month delay in 
implementing the CBA. With the old Yankee Stadium still standing after 311 
days, preventing the construction of parks to replace the ones covered over 
by the new stadium, some people have begun referring to the “Yankee 
Stadium Death Watch.” Neil deMause, Yankee Stadium Death Watch: Day 
331, N.Y. NEWS BLOG, http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/ 
2009/08/yankee_stadium_3.php. With problems such as these it seems fair to 
inquire into the propriety of the CBA, which was completed with no 
community participation and which is very likely unenforceable.  
The Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market and the Columbia 
University expansion have both raised controversies of their own, but their 
CBAs have received less criticism.  
203
Chris Togneri, Updated North Shore Plan Approved, PITTSBURG 
TRIBUNE REV., June 10, 2009, http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/ 
news/pittsburgh/s_628882.html. See also Oro Valley Town Council Minutes, 
Regular Session, Aug. 27, 2008 (“Town Attorney Tobin Rosen explained that 
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C. How Should a Local Government Respond if a CBA is 
Inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan?  
To the extent that CBAs cover land use and community 
development issues, they may produce a different vision for the 
neighborhood than the vision articulated in a legally adopted 
comprehensive plan covering the entire community. A recent 
example from the Bronx highlights how CBA provisions can 
conflict with government planning efforts in this manner. The 
Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance (“KARA”), the 
first truly inclusive grassroots CBA coalition in New York City, 
raised this problem in the summer of 2009 when, during 
negotiations, it demanded a ban on new grocery stores in the 
development. To some community members, the provision was 
intended to protect existing businesses and the jobs they 
provided; but to others, the ban was viewed as interfering with 
the community’s need for grocery stores with more healthy and 
organic food.
204
 For the redevelopment project to proceed, the 
site will need to be rezoned to C4-4
205
—a general commercial 
designation consistent with the comprehensive plan
206
 that 
typically permits grocery and other retail food stores.
207
 
Accordingly, the CBA poses the question of whether local 
groups should be able to modify generally applicable zoning 
                                                          
these agreements are great if neighbors and developers are willing to agree to 
it. He pointed out that the Town cannot require the agreement if the 
developer meets the requirements of the Zoning Code.”). 
204
Terry Pristin, Proposed Supermarket Divides Bronx Community, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/ 
realestate/commercial/30armory.html?_r=1.  
205
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE SHOPS AT THE ARMORY PROJECT Fig. 
S-4, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oec/downloads/pdf/08DME004X/08DME004 
X_FEIS/08DME004X_FEIS_00_Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009). 
206
The Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance Proposal Fig. S-4, 
S-6, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oec/downloads/pdf/08DME004X/08DME004X 
_FEIS/08DME004X_FEIS_00_Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009). 
207
NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, ZONING RESOLUTION 534 
(2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/allarticles.pdf. 
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regulations via private agreement, even if the city has 
specifically decided to apply those general regulations to the 
site. Although in many cases this type of use restriction would 
resemble a simple restrictive covenant, the city in the 
Kingsbridge case must implicitly approve any CBA related to 
the development because of the extensive subsidies being given 
to the developer.
208
 Can the city with one hand apply a uniform, 
general regulation, and with the other approve a private pact 
limiting the reach of the general law? 
Another hypothetical could be imagined where a 
comprehensive plan and implementing land use regulation 
articulates a preference for recreational facilities in designated 
areas, but such facilities are not planned for a neighborhood 
where a coalition has just negotiated a private CBA to include a 
neighborhood park. Such a CBA could be viewed as inconsistent 
with the comprehensive plan, raising the question of who speaks 
for the neighborhood. A core principle of the social justice 
movement is that the community speaks for itself.  What then, is 
the appropriate role of the government? If in fact the community 
coalition is representative of the views of the neighborhood it 
purports to represent, and where the neighborhood, speaking 
through its coalition representatives expresses the desire for a 
certain amenity that is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, 
whether the coalition and the project sponsor should legally 
agree to the amenity may be an open question.  Going back to 
the notion that the local government is responsible for the 
development, adoption and implementation of the comprehensive 
plan, where a CBA contains items that are inconsistent with that 
plan, should the locality view the CBA as public input and begin 
a process to amend the plan and regulations to make them 
consistent with such views? Or should the government refuse to 
amend the comprehensive plan, thereby preventing the project 
                                                          
208
See, e.g., Ivonne Salazar, Live Blogging From Armory IDA Hearing: 
Tax Breaks Approved, Land Use Review to Begin, BRONX NEWS NETWORK, 
Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.bronxnewsnetwork.org/2009/03/live-blogging-
from-armory-ida-hearing_11.html (discussing the last phase of the project 
going through the city’s land use review process). 
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sponsor from fulfilling its promises? This is a critical question 
for all private parties involved in the negotiation of a CBA. 
Legally binding CBAs arguably should not be entered into where 
one party lacks the legal ability to deliver on a promise, given 
that such situations are susceptible to manipulation and bad faith.  
Across the country there is a wide disparity as to the level of 
government involvement in the development and “acceptance” 
of CBAs as a condition of development approval. As noted 
above, local governments in California are likely to be at least 
tangentially involved in CBA negotiations. In these cases, the 
government’s involvement may lead to information for the 
parties indicating that land use related terms of the CBA may 
not be enforceable absent an adjustment to current planning 
documents and regulations. 
In states such as New York, where the government is not 
involved in purely private CBA negotiations, or at least is better 
advised not to be, the municipality must decide how, if at all, it 
should embrace the community coalition’s articulated desires for 
certain community amenities that are not currently part of the 
land use regulatory regime.  At a minimum, the planning 
department within the municipality will be on notice that the 
needs of certain sections of the community are not being met by 
the overall plan and vision for the community as a whole.  This 
information should be the basis for a re-evaluation of the 
comprehensive plan—either specific aspects of the plan or the 
plan as a whole—to make sure that the plan and its 
implementing regulations are serving the best interests of the 
jurisdiction as a whole. Nevertheless, as explained above, 
conditioning project approvals on criteria not included in the 
zoning ordinances or comprehensive plan may, if coercive 
enough, make the action unlawful.  
Further support for the notion that CBAs should inform and 
influence the comprehensive planning process, which should be 
ongoing and continuously evolving, is that the methodology used 
for the development of a CBA tends to be more inclusive than 
that used for the development of a comprehensive plan, at least 
where no community-based planning programs exist. The 
protocols used in coalition building for the purposes of 
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negotiating a CBA, including the consensus building process for 
articulating community desires, are more empowering than the 
typical opportunities for public participation in the development 
and implementation of a comprehensive plan. 
While it can be argued that local governments give up 
planning authority by yielding to the community desires 
expressed in CBAs that are inconsistent with the existing plan, it 
may be better viewed as the government doing exactly what it is 
supposed to be doing—viewing the planning process as ongoing 
and engaging public involvement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
When CBAs are negotiated by broad based, inclusive 
coalitions that are truly representative of community interests, 
and such agreements result in a community planning vision that 
dramatically differs from the existing traditional comprehensive 
plan and implementing regulations for the area, it indicates that 
existing governmental planning processes may be inadequate, 
and the most appropriate action for a local government to take 
may be to reform the way that it plans.
209
 As described above, a 
new paradigm of community-based planning and environmental 
justice has emerged that places an increased focus on 
                                                          
209
See Oro Valley Town Council Minutes, Regular Session, Aug. 27, 
2008, available at http://lexicon.orovalleyaz.gov/ACK/ArchiveSearch/ 
ArchiveSearch.htm (select Option 2; search minutes; enter date 08/27/08; 
select study session) (“Bill Adler, Town resident and member of the Planning 
& Zoning Commission presented information about Community Benefit 
Agreements. He explained that the current process of meeting with 
neighborhoods and developers could be formalized, bridging communication 
between neighbors, the Town and developers. He explained the importance of 
citizens first meeting without the applicant so they can be educated on the 
development review process, Zoning Code and entitlements and where effect 
of change can take place on the development so that they have an 
understanding of the process before meeting with the developer. Terry 
Parish, Town resident, encouraged the Council to formalize the process so 
that developers know upfront that the goal is to come to an agreement with 
neighbors and require neighbors to be educated on the development 
process.”). 
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transparency, accountability, and meaningful public 
participation, within the existing planning process. As explained 
by law professor Alejandro Esteban Camacho, there are four 
underlying reasons for developing more participatory planning 
models: 
(1) that an open negotiation process can thwart the 
corruption and unfair dealing so closely associated with 
conventional negotiated land use regulation; (2) that 
participatory processes are necessary to obtain important 
information about the interests and preferences of 
affected parties; (3) that fostering meaningful 
participation has a positive impact on both participants’ 
and the general public’s satisfaction with the regulatory 
process and outcomes; and (4) that direct participation 
serves the important goal of enhancing accountability for 
governmental services and decisions.
210
 
In California, local governments have responded to CBA 
campaigns by working closely with community groups and 
consistently incorporating CBAs into development agreements. 
The result, more often than not, has been an improved planning 
process for all parties. In New York and the many other states 
where development agreements have not been formally 
authorized, either by statute or judicial order, the CBA model is 
less ideal for fostering this type of collaboration. Other ways 
must be found to educate the public about the development 
process and make it more transparent, democratic and 
accountable. 
Fortunately, local governments and planning commissions 
already have the tools to improve the way that planning 
decisions are made. To list just a few methods to encourage 
community-based planning, local governments can:  
(1) make planning information easily accessible online 
and at designated public facilities in all communities and 
neighborhoods;  
(2) provide hearing notices that are actually designed to 
                                                          
210
Camacho II, supra note 54, at 279. 
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reach impacted community members, rather than the 
“rudimentary public notice”
211
 mandated by state or local 
law;  
(3) hold hearings in locations close to impacted 
neighborhoods and at times of day when community 
members are likely to be available;  
(4) hold additional public meetings, workshops, and other 
events in order to reach a diverse cross section of 
community members;  
(5) partner with existing neighborhood associations, civic 
organizations, and faith based entities which typically 
have established community networks; 
(6) make clear that planners will be responsive to 
neighborhood residents’ concerns and desires regarding 
future growth; and 
(7) express a commitment to ensure that community-
based planning is an integral part of the planning process 
and will, to the greatest extent practical, be incorporated 
into the comprehensive plan.  
Development controversies can also be headed off by 
including the community in discussions about proposed projects 
early enough in the process so that impacted stakeholders can 
help to shape project plans. Too often, communities do not get a 
chance to participate in the planning process until the developer 
has already worked out its financials and the local government 
has invested substantial resources in preliminary planning 
reviews, making it likely that the project’s fate has already been 
decided. The CBA movement has clearly demonstrated the 
importance of having a system in place whereby community 
members can feel that they play an important role not just in the 
planning process, but also in the development review process. 
Especially in those states that do not permit development 
agreements, leaving community involvement unregulated in the 
hands of private developers carries substantial risks that the 
CBA concept will be co-opted, abused, or ignored. Recognizing 
                                                          
211
Id. at 279–80. 
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this, local governments, as part of their continuous 
comprehensive planning function, should be proactive in 
developing alternative planning processes that advance the 
community benefits movement’s goals of inclusiveness, 
democracy, and accountability. 
 
